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ABSTRACT
The work of Caltech biologists, particularly, Edward Lewis, on leukemia and ionizing
radiation transformed the public debate over nuclear weapons testing.  The United States
began testing hydrogen bombs in 1952, sending radioactive fallout around the globe.
Earlier more localized fallout was generated starting in 1945 from tests of atomic
weapons at Nevada test sites.  The Atomic Energy Commission claimed the tests would
not harm human health.  Geneticists knew from animal and plant experiments that
radiation can cause both illness and gene mutations.  They spoke out to warn the
policymakers and the public. Edward Lewis used data from four independent populations
exposed to radiation to demonstrate that the incidence of leukemia was linearly related to
the accumulated dose of radiation. He argued that this implied that leukemia resulted
from a somatic gene mutation.  Since there was no evidence for the existence of a
threshold for the induction of gene mutations down to doses as low as 25 r, there was
unlikely to be a threshold for the induction of leukemia. This was the first serious
challenge to the concept that there would be a threshold for the induction of cancer by
ionizing radiation.  Outspoken scientists, including Linus Pauling, used Lewis’s risk
estimate to inform the public about the danger of nuclear fallout by estimating the
number of leukemia deaths that would be caused by the test detonations.  In May of 1957
Lewis’s analysis of the radiation-induced human leukemia data was published as a lead
article in Science magazine.  In June he presented it before the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy of the US Congress.
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1Chapter 1:   The relationship of the Genetics Community, the Caltech Community, and
Lewis’s contributions to the fallout debate
The National Context
Scientists were thrust into the public eye and the political arena after World War
II and the development of nuclear weapons.  The atomic bombs that devastated the cities
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945, although they led to the end of World War
II, increased mankind’s destructive capabilities by many orders of magnitude.  The fear
created by the Cold War, McCarthyism, and nuclear weapons pervaded the country and
added difficulty to the open discourse that is so important to the pursuit of scientific
knowledge.  At the same time as many scientists felt a responsibility to educate the
American people about the dangers of nuclear weapons and nuclear war, pressure was put
on others to reassure the public.
The stakes were raised in 1952 when the destructive technology of nuclear bombs
took a thousand-fold leap with the secret explosion of the first thermonuclear or hydrogen
bomb on the Eniwetok atoll in the Pacific Ocean.  The first publicly known tests began
on March 1, 1954 at Bikini.  Hydrogen bombs spread radioactive material higher and
farther, and deposited it over longer periods of time than the original atomic bombs.  This
prompted geneticists to warn of the known and suspected dangers of radiation exposure.
The first atomic bombs were powered by nuclear fission and generated several
forms of radiation, including radioactive fallout in the local area.  Fallout refers to
radioactive materials that are sent by the nuclear explosions into the atmosphere and are
later deposited on the ground, “falling out” of the contaminated sky; these materials
include strontium-90, cesium-137 and carbon-14, along with many other radioactive
elements.  While the first atomic bombs were powered by nuclear fission, hydrogen
2bombs are fission-fusion-fission weapons which can generate the same kinds of
radioactivity in far greater quantities.   Fallout from H-bombs is hurled by the explosion
into the troposphere and stratosphere.  The particles that stay in the troposphere come to
earth over a large area in a time period of months.  Those that reach the stratosphere
come down all over the globe, sometimes for years [1].
Global fallout presented new moral, ethical, and scientific problems with nuclear
weapons testing.  The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) claimed that any risks to
human health, if present, would be too small for concern.  However, scientific inquiry
had taught many that this was not the case.  Large doses of radiation could cause
radiation burns and illness, as happened to many early researchers who, at the turn of the
20th century, knew little of the danger.  Beyond these relatively immediate effects,
geneticists knew that X-rays generate deleterious mutations in animals and plants and had
shown that x-rays can cause leukemia and other cancers in animals.
The fact that radiation causes biological damage became clear when
experimenters experienced radiation burns shortly after the discovery of x-rays by
Roentgen in 1895, and of natural and artificial radioactivity a few years later.  Many
years later researchers began developing malignant tumors in places where they had
received large radiation exposures.  Radiation was anecdotally, and controversially,
linked to leukemia beginning around 1911. When the German Roentgen Society erected a
monument in memory of those who died as a result of their pioneering work studying
radiation in 1936, one hundred sixty-nine names were recorded.  These people died of
skin cancer, anemia, leukemia, accidents, and other causes [2].
3In their 1952 textbook General Genetics, Adrian Srb and Ray Owen noted that X-
rays cause mutations both in the somatic cells and in the germ cells [3, 252].  They
warned that while mutation “provides the raw material for progress” in evolution and
controlled breeding, it is generally a random process which usually results in deleterious
changes.  “Defective human germ plasm,” they said, “must therefore be considered
among the recognized hazards of atomic warfare, since the ionizing radiations increase
mutation rates” [3, 255].
Starting in 1954, many geneticists began to voice concern about the biological
effects of high energy or ionizing radiation.  These scientists were motivated by both
their sense of social responsibility and their scientific responsibility to asses the hazards.
They drew upon H. J. Muller’s 1927 discovery1 that X-rays cause mutations in fruit flies
at a rate linearly proportional to the dose of radiation [4].  President Eisenhower’s
stepped nuclear testing began at Bikini in 1954; the aggressive testing alarmed Muller.
He became greatly concerned for the genetic health of humanity because the majority, if
not all of the experimentally observed mutations induced by radiation were detrimental to
future generations.  As an established leader in the field of genetics, Muller encouraged
other geneticists speak out about the dangers of fallout to the human germ plasm.
Genetics has changed a great deal since Muller’s time.  Watson and Crick
discovered the chemical structure of DNA in 1953.  The implications of this discovery,
including the resulting acceptance of DNA, rather than protein, as the genetic material
were just beginning to be worked out during the years of the fallout debate.   Looking
back with current knowledge of DNA’s structure and function, pathways by which high
energy radiation can cause genetic damage both to the genetic material inside
                                                 
1 For which he received the 1946 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine.
4reproductive and somatic (body) cells can be understood with relationship to the
chemistry of DNA.  However, when the issue of hydrogen bomb testing arose, geneticists
and biochemists were trying to understand the chemical nature of the hereditary material.
At the time genes were units of inheritance located on chromosomes and understood by
their relationship with phenotypic characteristics.  Geneticists in the 1950s were faced
with a pressing need to explain both well established findings and the results of current
work to policymakers and the public so that any unnecessary exposure to radiation and
consequent health hazard would be avoided.
These tasks were fraught with difficulties.  The Atomic Energy Commission was
charged both with developing nuclear power for military and peaceful purposes and with
safeguarding the public health, missions that were sometimes mutually exclusive.  They
were quick to assert and defend the position that there was nothing to worry about from
nuclear testing, complicating efforts to access the danger.
In the June 1955 issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Muller explained his
motivation for speaking out about the dangers of radiation.  He felt it was his social and
moral responsibility to warn the public of the risks.  Muller wrote,
And now today, even in our own country, we see certain versions—or is it
perversions—of genetics raising their heads, not primarily among
geneticists, but among groups who wish to create a semblance of scientific
support for some preconceived policy.  The matter at issue now [1955] is
that of the genetic effects of radiation.”  [5, 296-302]
Genetic effects were not the only concern, although they received the most attention
before 1957.  Concerns about radiation-induced cancers were also left almost
unrepresented in the 1956 reports on the biological effects of radiation from the National
Academy of Sciences and the British Medical Research Council.  Scientists aware of the
5link between radiation and cancers saw these reports as clearly uninformed.  Sir Richard
Doll of England, who was researching the effects of ionizing radiation in the 1950s,
recalls that:
Further test explosions seemed certain to be carried out by competing
powers and determination of the quantitative effects of small doses of
radiation became a burning issue.  National committees were appointed in
the UK and the US to review the evidence.  Their reports made it clear that
no quantitative estimate of the risks could then be made (Medical
Research Council, 1956; National Academy of Sciences, 1956a) and an
immense amount of research was initiated.  [2]
From his home at Indiana University, Muller wrote letters to dozens of geneticists
throughout the United States.  Many of the recipients were connected to his mentor,
Thomas Hunt Morgan, founder of the Caltech biology department.  Among them was
fellow student of Morgan, Alfred Sturtevant, a professor at Caltech.
The Fallout Debate at Caltech
Sturtevant was a highly respected, established scientist.  He shared Muller’s
concerns about nuclear testing and the Atomic Energy Commission’s claims that there
was no danger from the radiation generated, and communicated them with the scientists
in his extensive networks.  In his June 1954 Presidential address to the Pacific Division of
the American Academy for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) on “Social Implications
of the Genetics of Man,” Sturtevant devoted half of the speech to “the effects of high-
energy radiation on the genetic properties of man.”  He warned that radiation can cause
burns and illness, including cancers, but these were not his primary concerns.  Like
Muller, Sturtevant feared the damage done by the increase in radiation to human genetic
material.  He explained that radiation caused detrimental, often gross, mutations in
experimental organisms.  Furthermore, he argued that humanity was in more danger than
6other organisms from the genetic effects of radiation because our social institutions
would inhibit the process of natural selection, which would otherwise eliminate most of
the detrimental mutations before the individuals carrying them had a chance to pass them
on.
While it is not possible to extrapolate quantitatively from laboratory organisms to
humans, Sturtevant put forward five qualitative conclusions that had “now been so
widely confirmed that we may confidently assert that they apply to all higher organisms,
including man”:
1) High-energy irradiation produces mutations.
2) The frequency of induced mutations is directly proportional to the
dosage of irradiation.  There is almost certainly no threshold value
below which irradiation is ineffective.
3) The effects of successive exposures are cumulative.
4) The effects are permanent in the descendants of the affected genes.
There is no recovery.
5) The overwhelming majority of these mutations is deleterious—that is,
they seriously affect the efficiency of individuals in later generations
in which they come to expression.  These deleterious genetic effects
may lead to early death or to a wide variety of defects, often gross
ones.
At the close of his speech, Sturtevant cited an official press release from the White House
that angered him.  In it Chairman Strauss of the Atomic Energy Commission stated that
the radiation generated by the nuclear tests was “far below the levels which could be
harmful in any way to human beings” [7].
It is important to understand that Sturtevant’s effort was not motivated by an
agenda to end nuclear testing.  He clearly states that he believed, “It may be that the
possible gains are worth the calculated risk,” but he felt that the risk and its far reaching
effects on the whole of humanity must be acknowledged and considered.   This approach
7was powerful because it had the effect of making the assertions of its adherents difficult
to dismiss as biased by a larger political agenda.
 Speaking out about the hazards of radiation, which government organizations did
not want to acknowledge, sometimes had consequences.  H.J. Muller’s submission to the
1955 International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was excluded.
Though he attended, he was not allowed to participate in the discussion because the
Atomic Energy Commission prevented him from being an official American delegate.
The AEC’s explanation for excluding such a prominent scientist was that Muller’s
mention of the bombing of Hiroshima made his paper inadmissible for a conference on
peaceful uses of nuclear power [8].
Muller’s exclusion of the conference moved George Beadle, chairman of the
Biology Division at Caltech and president of the AAAS, to write an editorial in Science.
Beadle stressed the need for “free and open discussion of the hazards to man of
radiation.”  While Muller’s views on these issues were very different from those stated by
the Atomic Energy Commission, they were not so distant from those supported by much
of the genetics community.  Muller received a standing ovation while he sat silently in
the audience of the conference’s panel meeting on “Genetic effects of radiation:  human
implications” [9].
Beadle and Sturtevant were not the only Caltech faculty speaking out about
nuclear testing.  On October 11th, 1956 they met for lunch with Professors Harrison
Brown, Matthew Sands, and Thomas Lauritsen, who were considering making a public
statement supporting a unilateral halt to nuclear testing so long as no other nations tested
bombs, as proposed by the Democratic presidential candidate, Adlai Stevenson [10].
8Each of these men had played a part in the building of the first atomic bombs:  Brown
had been the Assistant Director of Chemistry, Plutonium Project, Oak Ridge; during the
war Sands was a physicist at Los Alamos and Lauritsen was a physicist with the Office of
Scientific Research and Development [11].  Bearing the signatures of ten Caltech
physicists, their statement was published in the Los Angles Times three days after this
lunch meeting, October 14, 1956.
These men had many different reasons for wanting nuclear testing stopped.
Professor Robert Christy worked at Los Alamos and developed the trigger mechanism for
the plutonium bomb that was used on Nagasaki.  He was motivated by a desire to see an
end to the development of nuclear weapons and world-wide disarmament [12] [13].  The
main purpose of a halt to nuclear testing, according to these scientists, would be to “get
the negotiations [for international control of nuclear power] out of the deadlock stage.”
They listed four additional advantages, the first of which was that a halt to testing would
“decrease our exposure to radioactive fallout and its associated dangers.”
The next day both the president of Caltech, Lee DuBridge, and the chairman of
the board of trustees, Albert Ruddock, published statements condemning the physicists’
statement.  They reiterated that the physicists did not represent Caltech, which supported
the government’s policies [14].  DuBridge wrote,
The question of the best diplomatic methods of achieving these
agreements is not a subject on which scientists are especially competent to
render advice.  The principal technical question involved in the present
debate is whether large-scale tests are an important part of our weapons-
research program.  Those in responsible charge of that program assure us
that they are and that their discontinuance, therefore, should follow and
not precede enforceable international agreements.  In my own official
government contacts I have become convinced that this is the case.  [15]
9Additionally, several trustees, including future chairman of the AEC, John McCone,
wrote strong letters to the president about the inappropriateness of the physicists’
statement.  DuBridge’s position was unenviable, because on the one hand he had strong
government and AEC connections and a conservative board of trustees, and on the other,
a majority of the faculty who held liberal political views [16].
The Problem of Cancer and Fallout
Most of the geneticists (including Muller and Sturtevant) who spoke out about
fallout from 1954 through 1956 and into 1957 offered cautions about effects of the
radioactive substances on later generations.  It might have been possible to see if there
were more mutations in the progeny of parents who had been irradiated, from medical x-
rays or other sources.  However, none of the researchers were in positions to do such
work.  Furthermore, such work could not have been done very quantitatively.
In 1955 Sturtevant published an article entitled "The Genetic Effects of High-
Energy Irradiation of Human Populations," in the Caltech magazine Engineering and
Science.  In this article he explained, "No scientist interested in exact quantitative results
would touch the subject, were it not that its social significance leaves us no alternative.
We must, like it or not, try to get some sort of idea as to how much, of what, is happening
to how many people" [17].
In July of 1955 Beadle sent out a memo titled “Possible direct effects on man of
low level exposures to ionizing radiation.”  Direct effects meant effects on the present
generation that might be observable.  In the memo Beadle questioned the AEC’s
assumption that doses of radiation below 0.3 r units (Roentgens) per week and 3.9 r units
per year would not cause any important effects, these were the doses deemed safe for
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people living near the Nevada test site.  He cited a 1950 study showing that American
radiologists died of leukemia at a rate ten times that of non-radiologist MDs as a source
of his concern.  Then he proposed two ways of getting additional data on leukemia and
radiation in people.  The first was to do further studies of radiologists and the second was
to look at high altitude cities where inhabitants would be exposed to more cosmic
radiation than people who lived at lower altitudes [18].
There was no way to predict with much certainty how much radiation exposure
would result in how many mutations in human beings.  In 1937, a decade after his
discovery of X-ray generated mutations, Muller wrote “it is but a logical step to conclude
that carcinomas, sarcomas, and leukemias arising after irradiation represent mutations
induced by the latter” [4].  Muller and the other outspoken geneticists did not emphasize
this conclusion, that radiation could cause cancer.  Unlike what were referred to as the
genetic effects of radiation, these cancers, referred to then as somatic effects, would
manifest themselves within the present generation of people.  This made quantitative
study of leukemias and other cancers possible, though difficult.
Four months after Beadle’s memo, Edward Lewis wrote a memo to the Caltech
geneticists further addressing the problem of getting data on the direct effects of radiation
on man.  The memo is divided into two sections.  In the first section Lewis explains the
need for data on the physical measurements of radiation dosage because the information
being published by the AEC and other researchers was woefully incomplete.  In the
second section he laid the groundwork of a study of the available data on human
leukemia and ionizing radiation.
11
  Lewis noted that some forms of leukemia might have a mutational origin and
that the available data on the atomic bombing survivors showed a highly significant
increase in leukemia.  He wrote,
It is unlikely that direct radiation effects will show the simple linear
relationship to dosage that the genetic effect shows and that the direct
effects will be as independent of the time over which the dosage is
administered as the genetic effects are.  Nevertheless for discussion
purposes it may be useful to inquire what the rate of leukemia per r unit
per given population would be if the relationship to dosage is linear and if
all forms are considered radiation induced.
Using the linear model Lewis derived a rough estimate of this number from the incidence
of leukemia in the population that was within a kilometer of the explosion’s hypocenter.
This estimate of 2 to 12 cases of leukemia per 100,000 persons per r unit is a full order of
magnitude greater than the estimate he would reach after further study and publish a year
and a half later.  Once it is possible to estimate the radiation exposures of the different
groups of Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors, he wrote, “then the available data on
leukemia incidence in these groups becomes available for making the beginnings of
estimates of the direct effects of radiation” [19].
George Beadle, Alfred H. Sturtevant, Edward B. Lewis
Courtesy of the Caltech Archives PhotoNet Photo ID 1.47-7 (no date)
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Radiation and Leukemia:  Lewis’s Estimate
In his 1957 paper titled “Leukemia and Ionizing Radiation” Professor Edward
Lewis of Caltech used available data on populations that had been exposed to high energy
radiation to generate the most widely cited of the first quantitative risk estimates of
leukemia caused by radiation2.  Lewis worked on analyzing the available data on people
who had been exposed to radiation and making these estimates throughout 1956.  He
looked at four data sets:  atomic bomb survivors, adults who received radiation therapy
for anklosing spondylitis (arthritis of the spine that strikes young people, typically
between 17 and 35 years old [20]), infants who were irradiated to treat thymic
enlargement, and American radiologists who were occupationally exposed to radiation
over many years.  From these data Lewis derived a linear dose-response curve and the
risk estimate of 2 cases of leukemia per million persons per rad per year.
The debate over the effects of fallout on human beings had reached a point of
being one ideologically influenced expert opinion against another.  George Beadle would
later explain the problem,
If one takes the position that the probability of war can be reduced most
effectively by a build-up of nuclear weapons to the point that no nation
will dare to use them, one tends to argue that the biological hazards of
bomb-testing are of such relative insignificance that they can be
disregarded.
On the other hand, if one is strongly convinced that such a building-up of
nuclear weapons, involving ultimately many nations, will greatly increase
the chance of nuclear war, there is an almost irresistible tendency to
bolster the position with arguments that sound scientific but are not.  [21]
                                                 
2 Santosh Kumar Mazumdar and A. Nagartnam estimated the risk to be 3 cases of leukemia per million
people per year per roentgen in an article published in the British Medical Journal on March 30, 1957.  This
paper is reprinted in Part two of the Joint Committee’s report on The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and its
Effects on Man pages 1684-86.
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Lewis’s quantitative study shifted the debate by focusing on available data on human
beings, rather than extrapolating from animal models or anecdotal evidence.  His paper
and testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy transformed the debate over
nuclear testing because it raised for the first time the possibility that fallout could result in
leukemia.  This work made the danger of fallout real and definite; even though the risk
estimate predicted only a relatively small increase in the incidence of leukemia due to
nuclear testing.  Lewis’s analysis of human data, and the integrity he brought to it, broke
through the ideological divisions between those who argued that testing nuclear weapons
would increase national security and those who argued that it would decrease national
security and increase the chances of devastating nuclear war.
The most controversial aspect of his analysis was the linear dose-response curve.
This relationship made sense to geneticists who had found a linear relationship between
radiation and mutations in Drosophila down to 25 rad (Stern and Spencer).  Additionally,
it fit with the hypothesis of Muller that cancer could result from somatic mutations.  This
was not the accepted idea in other scientific and medical communities.  Rather, as the
official voice, the AEC medical doctors and scientists promoted the assumption that there
would be a threshold below which radiation would do no harm, just as there is frequently
such a threshold in chemical toxicology because the body can process small quantities of
toxins like alcohol.  The AEC vocally assumed and defended the threshold hypothesis;
furthermore, they seem to have assumed that the amount of radiation received by
Americans from fallout would be less than the threshold.  Lewis found no evidence for
such a threshold, and the AEC scientists were unable to offer any.
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Lewis was the point-person for the linearity hypothesis at the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy Congressional Hearings in 1957.  Both Linus Pauling, who won the 1954
Nobel Prize for chemistry, and Albert Schweitzer, holder of the 1952 Peace Prize,
became active opponents of nuclear testing in part due to the information Lewis provided
in his paper.  With the force of their personalities and the fame generated by their Nobel
prizes, they took the statements of many geneticists, including Lewis, to an international
audience.  Pauling used Lewis’s estimate to predict the number of people that would be
killed by leukemia as a result of test detonations, and informed the public of the
magnitude of health hazards.  Lewis’s work entered the debate over nuclear testing
through several different channels, and it made a crucial contribution to the scientific and
public debates that led to the Limited Nuclear Test Ban which halted atmospheric nuclear
weapons testing in 1963.
Edward Lewis is now 84 years old and a celebrated man.  Mendel worked in his
pea garden unraveling secrets of heredity; Lewis has spent his life studying fruit flies and
discovering natural rules that are at the foundation of modern genetics.  In 1995 he shared
the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for his “discoveries concerning the genetic
control of early embryonic development.”   In addition, he received prestigious awards
including the National Medal of Science (1990), and two honorary degrees, one from the
University of Umea in Sweden (1981) and the other from his undergraduate alma matter,
the University of Minnesota (1993).  Lewis’s Nobel biography, and Pete Magee’s
presentation speech at the University of Minnesota, describe his many and foundational
contributions to developmental genetics.  Nevertheless, they do not mention Lewis’s role
in the debate over nuclear fallout [22] [23].
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In many respects Edward Lewis’s personality makes it surprising that he would
choose to do scientific work in such a politically charged area.  Lewis is a quiet man.
Most days he can be found in his office, which looks more like a part of the lab than a
separate office.  There are fruit flies in small glass bottles on a metal cart, microscopes, a
sink, other research equipment and, in the corner nearest the door, a desk with a large
computer monitor, bookshelves, and a filing cabinet.  A piece of wood, the kind one
would hang tools from in the garage, has been attached to the desk and prevents people in
the hallway from seeing Lewis at work.  He is not fond of much attention; although he
has many awards, none hang on the walls of his office.
Lewis did not seek to campaign against nuclear testing.  His motivation in
researching the biological effects of fallout was not primarily political, he wrote “I was
not motivated by hoping the result would argue that weapons testing should cease on
biological grounds, namely genetic damage” [24].  Rather, he was intrigued with the
opportunity to study Muller’s hypothesis that somatic mutations could cause cancer in
human beings[25].  Lewis explained his involvement in the fallout debate in an interview:
I simply planned to publish what I could find out from existing data on
somatic effects and never thought of it as a public policy issue….What I
was doing was essentially treating radiation risks as a public health
problem.  I learned that only after being on the PHS radiation committee
[1958].  I was often ridiculed for worrying about risks of the magnitude as
the one involved in leukemia.  Better to state the risks than to tell people
there is simply no danger as the AEC did.  Also I pointed out in my Joint
Committee statement that the risk estimates are so low (for leukemia) that
an individual receiving even a large dose of irradiation (to cure or alleviate
symptoms of a tumor for example) can be reassured that his or her lifetime
risk will still be relatively low.  This of course showed that there is another
side to the making of risk estimates. [26] [emphasis added]
16
Chapter 2:  Lewis's risk estimate
Early work on the biological effects of radiation
In 1954 Ed Lewis established a new method for measuring the biological effects
of radiation by using detected chromosomal rearrangements in fruit flies as an index.  His
paper on the subject was entitled “The Theory and Application of a New Method of
Detecting Chromosomal Rearrangements in Drosophila Melanogaster.”  He called the
method the “biothorax” method because it grew out of his work on the biothorax genes.
In his lab at Caltech Lewis exposed flies to known doses of X-rays from an X-ray
machine.  At Argonne National Laboratory he exposed flies to known doses of gamma
rays from Cobalt-60 and to fast neutrons from the nuclear reactor (also called “the pile”).
Another set of flies was carried by Lewis’s colleague, Professor Beadle, to a nuclear test
site, where they were exposed to an unknown dose of radiation from the nuclear
explosion [27].  Beadle took the flies because Lewis did not receive the security
clearance to do so.  Lewis believes that he was denied clearance because he visited
another academic at his home to play chess.  This man was later found to be a
Communist ring leader whose group was meeting under the guise of a chess club.
Looking back Lewis is thankful that he was not allowed to take the trip and expose
himself to the significant dose of radiation that Beadle received.  In fact, Lewis was
angered by the lack of concern for radiation safety in the handling of the experiment.
Lewis considered dangerous both Beadle’s exposure and that flies were returned to his
laboratory in radioactive metal containers.
Within a day of their exposure, Lewis mated the flies and then looked for
biothorax mutations in their progeny.  Specifically, he looked for the growth of the
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metanotum on the fly’s metathoractic region.  This is a tissue covered by tufts of hair that
ranges in the flies from absent to covering about the width of a first abdominal segment.
The flies with the widest metanotums, those in the higher grades on Lewis’s scale, were
determined to have induced mutations.
[27]
The number of flies with this wide band of tissue increased linearly with radiation
dosage from the fast neutrons.  Lewis explains that this linear relationship, derived from
the fast neutron experiments, “served as the best available prediction curve for the
unknown dosages received at the nuclear detonation sites” [27].  Using this relationship
and his observations of the number of mutated flies from the nuclear detonations, Lewis
calculated back to the doses that these flies had received.  These calculations were in
agreement with the available physical measurements, supporting the validity of the
method and the direct correlation between the dose and biological effects of fast neutrons.
Another conclusion of this study is that these fast neutrons, generated by nuclear
reactions, are more effective than X-rays and gamma rays at producing biothorax
rearrangements in fruit flies [27].  This elegant study furthered Lewis’s understanding of
18
the biological effects of radiation on fruit flies and his curiosity about what findings
would hold for human beings.
The Effects of Radiation on Humans
From the very beginning of the Manhattan Project, radiation safety was a
significant problem.  During World War II different groups with varying amounts of
information took different levels of precaution.  Caltech Professor of Physics, Charles
Barnes, who worked in the joint Canadian-British Atomic Energy Project in Canada
during W.W. II, was very surprised when he moved to the United Kingdom immediately
after W.W. II, and later to the United States, to find that most nuclear researchers were
much less concerned about the health hazards from radioactivity, and from X-rays and
neutrons from accelerators, than those in his wartime laboratory.  Some physicists
seemed quite oblivious to the possibility of serious radiation damage to their health, such
as cancer, cataracts, and immune system damage [28].  In the 1950s, some involved
individuals and administrators were ignorant of the dangers, others simply had more
important places to put their attention, and some were cautious.  There was no real
consensus on where to set “worry limits” or safety precautions.  AEC spokesmen told the
American people that low-levels of radiation were not dangerous.  On the other hand,
there could be no debate about the effects of high radiation doses.  Scientists at Oak
Ridge National Laboratory (where the uranium was processed) were trying to find ways
to treat people who were injured by large, accidental radiation exposures3.
                                                 
3 The work of the Oak Ridge scientists, including that of Professor Ray Owen, eventually
led to the ability to do bone marrow transplants, and other forms of organ transplants 16.
Owen, R., Interview 7-9-02, b.J. Caron, Editor. 2002: Pasadena..
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What was at issue was not whether radiation was dangerous, but how much was
required to be considered a threat.  With most chemical toxins there is a threshold dose
below which the body can process the toxin without harm.  Also, repeated small
exposures to most of these toxins do not create problems.  In his 1958 book No More
War!, Linus Pauling uses the example of sleeping pills, explaining that one a night is not
very harmful, but to take a month’s supply at once could kill a person.  Many people,
including the AEC spokesmen, assumed that such a threshold existed for high energy
radiation and some people still believe this to be the case.  Because of repeated
experiments inducing mutations with X-rays that showed a linear correlation between
radiation dose and mutation rates, many geneticists did not expect to find a threshold.
They expected a linear relationship between radiation and its damaging effects.
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From the 1957 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Hearings on the Effects of
Radiation on Man, Summary-Analysis, page 14 [29]  (Please note that the percentages
given on the vertical axis are misrepresented if the dose units are assumed to be
comparable to any in use.)
Professor Sturtevant had spoken about the genetic effects of high energy radiation
at his presidential address to the AAAS, which was published in the September 10, 1954
issue of Science [17].  He continued his discussion of these concerns in an article titled
“The Genetic Effects of High-Energy Irradiation of Human Populations,” published in
Caltech’s January 1955 Engineering and Science magazine.  On July 8th of the same year,
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Beadle brought up the issue of leukemia caused by radiation.   He issued a one-page
memo to the Caltech genetics faculty titled “Possible direct effects on man of low level
exposures to ionizing radiation.”  Beadle pointed out that the “permissible” or “tolerance”
dose assumes that low doses of radiation will cause no important effects.  Beadle
questioned this assumption on the grounds that a study of American radiologists showed
them to die of leukemia at 20 times the rate of non-radiologist MDs.  Furthermore,
Beadle speculated that the AEC’s established “permissible dose” of radiation could mean
an increase in leukemia by a factor of one and a half, or five or more for communities
receiving the “permissible” dose around the Nevada nuclear testing site.  He asked,
“Does this speculation make any sense?  Is there any reason to believe that low level
exposures to radiation do not cause leukemia – and other neoplasms?”  In an effort to
think of a way to answer the question, he considered getting more data on humans from
further studies of radiologists and studies of other exposed medical professionals like x-
ray technicians and dentists.  What fraction of spontaneous leukemia might be caused by
natural radiation was another important question.  Beadle speculated that the observed
“increased incidence of cancer in general may result at least partly from the widespread
use of X-rays in therapy, diagnosis and industry” [18].  This last speculation was borne
out by further studies.
Ed Lewis added a memo in a similar vein on November 28th.  His cover note to
Linus Pauling reads:
The attached memo was prepared for private circulation at Cal Tech only and has
been sent to Dr. Bacher [the provost] and to the geneticists in Kerckhoff.  Its
purpose is to call attention to the shortcomings of the published information on
the physical measurements of fallout.  At Dr. Beadle’s suggestion I am
considering sending this memo, along with a covering and softening letter, to
some of the people in AEC (Dunning and Dunham).  Beadle has been assured that
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AEC is prepared to cooperate in providing more information and the point has
been made by the AEC that no one has specifically requested information (this
was in response to some inquiries Beadle recently made about certain aspects of
the physical measurements.)
This memo is divided into two parts.  The first part deals with the inadequacies of the
available physical measurements of dosage and the consequent inability to estimate
genetic damage.  The second part deals with the “direct effects of irradiation,”
specifically, leukemia.
Lewis found the available physical measurements of fallout to be lacking.  He
explains that the cumulative dosage received by the population would be required for
“assessing genetic (and other biological damage).”  The most authoritative fallout curves
did not include measurements during the times of nuclear testing; furthermore, they only
gave detailed information for the northeastern United States.  Additionally, they did not
address the contributions of beta and gamma radiation from the explosions.  Lastly, the
methods used to measure fallout were less than ideal.  Lewis argued that at least some
direct measurements should have been taken with r meters, which measure radiation in
Roentgens (r units); instead, the “gummed strip” method was used.  One consequence of
these shortcomings was that the total average dose received by the citizens of the United
States remained unclear.  “Finally,” Lewis concluded, “an estimate, obviously of the
greatest importance for estimating genetic damage, of the dosage extended over all time
is needed [19].”
Part II, “Direct Effects of Irradiation,” leads directly into Lewis’ 1957 paper
where he established the linearity hypothesis and estimated the incidence of leukemia
induced per radiation dose.  He explained that the genetic effects that had been
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extensively discussed are linked to direct effects because mutations in body cells could be
the cause of some cancers.
Lewis discussed data on survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki published in 1955 which
showed a “highly significant” increase in leukemia for those populations, especially close
to the hypocenter over which the bombs exploded.  In this draft, Lewis was hesitant about
the linear relationship between radiation dose and leukemia incidence:
It is unlikely that the somatic effects will show the simple linear
relationship to dosage that the genetic effect shows and that the direct
effects will be as independent of the time over which the dosage is
administered as the genetic effects are.  Nevertheless for discussion
purposes it may be useful to inquire what the rate of leukemia per r unit
per given population would be if the relationship to dosage is linear and if
all forms are considered radiation induced.
As quoted above, Lewis discussed linearity as a useful inquiry.  In the course of the next
year and a half his commitment to this hypothesis grew and in 1957 it was a strong, well-
reasoned assertion.  After ascertaining that more animal work was needed to generalize
the finding in mice that leukemia can be radiation-induced, Lewis proposed a course of
action.  If average dosages could be assigned to the groups of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
survivors, then it would be possible to make “the beginnings of estimates on the direct
effects of radiation” [19].
In some ways it is surprising that Edward Lewis undertook the politically charged
task of making these estimates of the relationship between radiation and leukemia in
human beings.  Lewis has always been a very quiet and humble man.  Patiently finding
elegant ways to learn nature’s rules of development in his unadorned laboratory, and
teaching his students, seems to make Professor Lewis happy; by contrast, he finds large
quantities of attention draining.  His loyalty is to the truth of experience, and he shows no
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desire to bend or stretch that truth for political ends.  When asked what motivated him to
do this work, he answered:  “I think I was prompted by a lunch conversation at the
Athenaeum in which I became aware that some faculty, possibly physicists, I am not
sure, were unaware of the possibility that ionizing radiation, even at low levels, could
induce cancer [26].”  Later he explained his scientific curiosity in the matter with
enthusiasm.  Muller had hypothesized that some cancers could be caused by mutations in
somatic cells, and radiation exposure from nuclear weapons was an opportunity to collect
data on human beings [25].  This research would be valuable both to the study of genetics
and to the campaign to end nuclear testing.  Lewis’s primary motivation was the former
and, while his work was very important to it, he tried to keep some distance between
himself and the campaign.
His motivation and that of the other geneticists who spoke out about the
biological impacts of nuclear weapons testing in the 1950s involved an element of social
conscience that took them beyond the scientific curiosity that led them into the field of
genetics.  In the case of the effects of radiation on people, Lewis was seeking to supply
the best available information to policymakers and the public to inform the decision to
test or not to test hydrogen bombs.  Lewis is proud of this important and far reaching
contribution.  In his nine-page autobiographical draft, three pages are devoted to his work
on radiation.  He writes,
When the US began testing atomic weapons in Nevada, I became intrigued
with the possibility that the induction of cancers by ionizing radiation
might be linearly related to the dose just as mutations in the germ line of
Drosophila had been shown by H. J. Muller, as already mentioned.  I was
surprised to find that it was generally assumed that there would be a
threshold dose below which there would be no induction of cancer.  [30]
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In his autobiographical sketch Lewis explains that his work on radiation was an
extra-curricular activity.  At the same time he was teaching, carrying out a research
program, and overseeing the Drosophila stock collection [30].  Lewis believes that his
lectures suffered in the introduction to genetics course he was teaching while preparing
“Leukemia and Ionizing Radiation,” as he spent many late nights on the paper.
The Draft of “Leukemia and Ionizing Radiation”
Lewis circulated drafts of his papers on the Caltech campus.  A year after his
“Memorandum on Fallout,” in November 1956, he sent out a second draft with a note
saying, “Comments and especially criticisms are earnestly solicited” [31].  It would be far
better to receive criticism on the draft, at home at Caltech, than on the published version,
amidst the growing national debate over nuclear testing.  However, his draft paper and its
results did reach people outside of the Caltech community.  Professor of Geochemistry
Harrison Brown had become a full-time activist for international control of nuclear power
and disarmament.  He either sent a copy of Lewis’ draft to 1953 Nobel Peace Laureate
Albert Schweitzer or communicated its content.
Linus Pauling used the risk estimate from the draft before the paper was
published.  He gave a lecture on abnormal hemoglobins to the Chicago Section of the
American Chemical Society in which he mentioned fallout radiation as a small source of
genetic mutations.  After the talk he was asked about the magnitude of the radiation effect
from fallout.  He answered that it was relatively small, and added the estimate that 1000
people would die of leukemia if the British were to detonate another hydrogen bomb with
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5 megatons of fission.  AEC Commissioner W. F. Libby was the scientist spokesman for
the AEC and he was quick to write Pauling,
I am very interested in the details of your calculation of this number.  I
suppose that we probably know more about radioactive fallout than you
do, but I am quite certain that none of us here knows as much about
leukemia, so I would like very much to see your calculation.  I enclose
copies of my most recent speeches on radioactive fallout and I would
much appreciate receiving yours.  [32]
In his reply Pauling, noted that he was speaking to a small group and did not expect or
know that a reporter was present.  He cited Lewis’s manuscript, a copy of which had
already been sent to Libby’s office at the AEC, and copied his reply to Professors Beadle,
Brown, and Lewis.
In his second draft Lewis begins by connecting the established concern about
genetic damage to reproductive cells and the concern that radiation damage to somatic
cells would cause cancer.  The stated purpose of the paper was to examine the “abundant
evidence in man for the induction of leukemia by ionizing radiation” and “to attempt an
estimate of the quantitative relation between radiation dose and probability of developing
leukemia” [31].
Lewis’s confidence about the linear relationship between radiation dose and
leukemia incidence had grown since his “Memorandum on Fallout” a year earlier.  In that
memorandum Lewis expected to be unable to see this linear relationship.  However, he
found that the data on both the Japanese survivors and the ankylosing spondylitis patients
were “compatible with a linear dose curve” [31].  Still, Lewis’s assertions about linearity
remained cautious.  In this second draft he wrote,
There is insufficient evidence on hand to evaluate the shape of the curve
relating dose to incidence of leukemia, especially in the low dose region.
The data on leukemia among Japanese survivors and the data on leukemia
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among patients irradiated for ankylosing spondylitis are compatible with a
linear dose curve but they by no means prove the point….Since mutation
in the germ cells shows a linear relationship to dosage measured in r units,
for doses as low as 25 r, somatic mutation rate and dose are probably
linearly related.
In this second draft Lewis addresses the assumption that a threshold exists below which
leukemia would not be induced by saying, “Although the numbers are small there is no
obvious indication of a threshold dose for the induction of leukemia” [31].
“Leukemia and Ionizing Radiation,” by E. B. Lewis, published in Science on May
17, 1957, is not as soft on the threshold idea.  Here Lewis argues first from his data and
then backs this up by explaining that the linear dose response curve can be explained by
the somatic mutation hypothesis.  This is the hypothesis that mutations in the genetic
material of body cells can cause cancer.  Speaking on the same two sets of data, Lewis
stated,
This is presumptive evidence that the relationship between incidence of
induced leukemia and dose of radiation is either linear or approximately
linear….these data provide no evidence for a threshold dose for the
induction of leukemia.  Moreover, chronic irradiation at a relatively low
dose rate (perhaps 0.1 rad per day or less) appear to induce leukemia in
radiologists at a rate per rad which is comparable to that observed for the
Japanese survivors.  This finding also fails to support the concept of a
threshold dose below which leukemia will not develop.
A linear relationship between dose of radiation and gene mutation in fruit flies
had been established more than two decades earlier.  The somatic mutation hypothesis
gives a possible mechanism to explain why the incidence of leukemia should be linear
with respect to dose.  Furthermore, since gene mutation had been shown to be directly
proportional to cumulative doses, it follows that leukemia would also be directly
proportional to the cumulative dose received by the animal.  This is a tight argument for
linearity because it is founded on multiple sets of independent data and explained by the
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well established hypothesis that radiation could induce cancer by causing genetic
mutations within cells [33].
The list of citations grows from the second draft to the published paper.  The draft
has 33 notes and citations; there are 57 in the final paper.  Most of the additions are
explanatory notes and references to statements made by AEC personnel.  Among the
most important references are those to the 1956 reports on the biological and human
effects of nuclear radiation by the US National Academy of Science and the British
Medical Research Council.   References to Muller’s work on the genetic effects of
radiation in fruit flies provide some of the scientific grounding.  Alice Stewart et. al. had
very recently published a study that provided a strong piece of evidence for leukemia
induction by low-doses of x-rays.  By interviewing mothers of children who died of
leukemia and also a matched group of mothers whose children did not develop leukemia,
Stewart’s team established that those children whose mothers had then-common pelvic x-
rays while pregnant had twice the risk of developing childhood leukemia than those
whose mothers had not been x-rayed [31] [33].
Lewis’s published paper is stronger on the linearity hypothesis than his draft.  The
draft stated, “there is no obvious indication of a threshold dose for the induction of
leukemia.”  The final paper stated, “these data provide no evidence for a threshold dose
for the induction of leukemia.”  Added to the final version is a section titled “Application
to Radiostrontium Exposure” where Lewis predicted that the recommended “safe” limit
for the public of 0.1 MPC of strontium 90 “would be expected to increase the present
incidence of leukemia (in the United States) by about 5 to 10 percent.”
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The “Loaded Dice” editorial by Graham DuShane
Science editor Graham DuShane preceded Lewis’s paper with an insightful
editorial entitled “Loaded Dice” about the debate over the health effects of nuclear testing
and the significance of Lewis’s paper.  He puts Lewis’s contribution in political and
historical perspective.  The health effects of radiation had become a topic of political
debate and “linked with questions of national power and prestige,” greatly complicating
efforts at dispassionate scientific discussion.  DuShane wrote,
Thanks to Lewis, it is now possible to calculate—within narrow
limits—how many deaths from leukemia will result in any population
from any increase in fallout or other source of radiation….We are
approaching the point at which it will be possible to make the phrase
‘calculated risk’ mean something a good deal more precise than the ‘best
guess’.  [34]
Echoing Sturtevant’s warning two years earlier, DuShane concluded, “It is apparent that
the atomic dice are loaded.  The percentages are against us and we ought not play unless
we must to assure other victories.”
DuShane took some heat for this editorial from AEC officials and the President of
Caltech, Lee DuBridge4.  Lewis recalls that the AEC sent some of their Biology Division
scientists to the Science office demanding that DuShane, “take steps to counter my
article” [35].  Lewis met these men in the elevator on his way out the building,
Graham DuShane told me he had received a very strong letter from
DuBridge protesting the loaded dice editorial.  I was in his office the day
he received it (I was in Washington to testify before the joint committee
on atomic energy). He was extremely upset by the letter and had somehow
                                                 
4 Unfortunately it is not possible to confirm this letter because it is not in the DuBridge
papers in the Caltech Archives and DuShane’s papers were not saved.
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mislaid the letter as he wanted to show it to me.  That same day as I was
leaving his office several top AEC people came in the building on their
way to see him.  [26]
A year later, Science published a critical letter from A. W. Kimball, a statistician
at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Austin Brues, Director of the Biology and
Medicine Division of Argonne National Laboratory.  When asked if he knew anything
about the circumstances under which Kimball and Brues wrote their critical articles,
Lewis responded, “Yes, the Atomic Energy Commission immediately alerted these
people to attack my article” [36].  The year of 1957 was very busy for the fallout debate
and a great deal occurred before these critical papers were published.
The 1957 Biology Division Annual Report
George Beadle was more careful than DuShane to acknowledge the limits of
available knowledge when he put the questions in context in the introduction to the 1957
Caltech Biology Division Annual Report:
Are gene mutations in body cells responsible for some or all
malignancies?  The answer is not known.  The question is important, for if
gene mutation is indeed responsible, one might well expect a direct linear
relation between exposure of the cells of an individual to ionizing
radiation and the chance of developing a malignancy such as leukemia.  A
linear relation at all levels of exposure would mean that there is a real
hazard even at levels as low as those of background.  Present radioactive
fallout from testing of nuclear weapons is perhaps only one-tenth of
background, but if the relation is linear at all levels, this would increase
the incidence of malignancy by a small but real amount.  On the other
hand, if there is a threshold below which no effect is produced and if that
threshold level is higher than background plus medical radiation plus
fallout, there may be little to worry about in this regard.  Presently
available data for man are insufficient to answer the question of linearity
at all levels.  The data are consistent with a linear relationship but they are
also consistent with the hypothesis that there is a threshold at low levels.
[37]
31
Lewis’s abstract in the Annual Report which introduces his work on radiation and
leukemia explains that the work was supported by the “General Funds” of the Institute,
not by an outside grant.  It is interesting to note that the AEC was a funding source on a
research project on reverse mutation and gene duplication that he also worked on that
year.  Lewis wrote,
It has long been suspected that cancer may in some cases arise as the result
of a somatic mutation.  Thus, in a malignant disease, a part of the body
contains cancerous cells which act as if they were permanently altered in
their growth rate compared to normal body cells.  Such a cancerous line of
cells presumably stems from a mutation in one (or more) of the normal
body cells.  X-rays and other ionizing radiations are known to be very
effective agents in producing mutations in the body cells as well as in the
germ cells.  Hence, on the somatic mutation hypothesis for the origin of
cancer, it is not surprising that ionizing radiations prove to be powerful
cancer-producing agents.
Abundant evidence is now at hand that the malignant blood disease,
leukemia, can be induced by ionizing radiations.  A review of this
evidence has been undertaken in order to study how the increase in
incidence of this disease after irradiation is related to the exposure dose.
The conclusion is that the relation appears to be one of direct
proportionality, at least over the range of doses which have been studied.
In particular, levels of radiation exposure which have often been claimed
to be well below a threshold dose for the induction of leukemia are
probably effective in inducing it after all.  A detailed account of these
studies has been published.  [37]
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Chapter 3:  The Joint Committee Hearings.  To the public and scientific press.
Lewis’s paper, “Leukemia and Ionizing Radiation,” was published in Science on
May 17, 1957.  Beadle and Brown had pushed him to publish, this, he explains, made the
writing “a little rushed” [26].  The timing was politically opportune.
The issue of fallout from nuclear testing was pushed front and center by a
convergence of forces in 1957.  In January, the British government announced its plans to
test a hydrogen bomb on Christmas Island, which threatened both the Hawaiians and the
Japanese.  After great controversy, the bomb was detonated on May 15th, another on May
31st, and a third on June 20th.  On April 24th, the Nobel Committee issued Schweitzer’s
“Declaration of Conscience.”  Linus Pauling circulated a rapidly successful petition from
the world’s scientists for an end to nuclear testing [38, 125 and 139].
These forces also brought Representative Chet Holifield, chairman of the Special
Congressional Subcommittee on Atomic Energy, to call and orchestrate the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy’s hearings on “The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and its
Effects on Man.”   The Joint Committee’s staff began their study on fallout had
commenced while the pressure was building in the summer of 1956.  The hearings
occurred, in sync with these other expressions of concern, from May 27th to 29th and June
3rd to 7th.  They were the first Congressional investigations into the effects of radiation on
public health.  They flooded the media and American public with information and expert
opinions.  The published record is 2000 pages of small print [29].
Schweitzer’s Declaration, Libby’s Letter, Brown’s Response to Libby’s Letter
Albert Schweitzer’s “Declaration of Conscience” was issued by the Nobel Prize
Committee on April 24th and broadcast over the radio from Oslo, Norway.  The full text
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of his statement was published in the Saturday Review on May 18th.  Three months
earlier, Norman Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review, visited Dr. Schweitzer at his
hospital in French Equatorial Africa.  After discussing the problem of nuclear testing and
Dr. Schweitzer’s careful attention to the development of nuclear power, Cousins asked
him to issue a statement.  Schweitzer asserted that this problem was in the domain of
scientists and that throughout his long life (he was eighty-three), he had “carefully stayed
away from making pronouncements on public matters.”  Later he wrote that he would
“get the fullest information from and check his facts with scientists of worldwide repute”
and then issue a statement calling for the “right to know.”  A draft of Ed Lewis’s paper
on radiation and leukemia was among the scientific studies that reached Schweitzer.
Harrison Brown received a copy from Lewis, which Lewis did not expect to be passed
on.  Brown was an editor for the Saturday Review and a professor of both science and
government and geochemistry at Caltech [26].  Cousins explains Schweitzer believed
“that before anything constructive could be done people had to have full information on
the basis of which a moral climate of opinion could be created.”
 In the Declaration, Schweitzer explained that, like many others, he felt a duty to
act “in warning of the danger.”  His statement covers four pages in the magazine.  A
small portion of it is devoted to the history of nuclear weapons.  From this history,
Schweitzer goes on to answer the informative questions:  What is radioactivity? Where
does it come from and what forms does it take?  What is radioactive fallout? How does it
enter and impact the human being? What diseases are caused by internal radiation, such
as accumulated strontium 90, and how will the effects impact future generations?
Schweitzer’s argument is based on two premises:  First, that nuclear testing is morally
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wrong because the whole world pays the costs in health and life for the military security
of a few nations; and second, that human beings have a “right to know” what is being
done to them and their world.  Calling radioactive fallout “the greatest and most terrible
danger,” Schweitzer issued the challenge:  “We must muster the insight, the seriousness,
and the courage to leave folly and to face reality.”  How?  The nuclear powers, America,
Britain, and the Soviet Union, should come to an agreement to cease nuclear testing.
Showing his respect for the difficulties of international politics, he wrote:  “There must
be guarantees preventing the agreement from being signed by anyone intending to win
important tactical advantages foreseen only by him.”  The responsibility of those with the
right to know is to hold an informed opinion.  Schweitzer holds that the agreement should
be the product of, and enforced by, public opinion.  He explained:
When public opinion has been created in the countries concerned and
among all nations, an opinion informed of the dangers involved in going
on with the tests and led by the reason which this information imposes,
then the statesmen may reach an agreement to stop the experiments.
A public opinion of this kind stands in no need of plebiscites or forming of
committees to express itself.  It works through just being there.  [39]
Dr. William F. Libby was a chemist who worked on the Manhattan Project at
Columbia during World War II and served on the AEC from 1954 to 19595  He replied to
Dr. Schweitzer in a widely circulated open letter the day after his declaration.  Just as the
“Declaration of Conscience,” Libby’s letter was published in full by the Saturday Review
[40].  Libby, a scientist himself, contended that the risk from nuclear weapons testing was
small, “extremely small compared with other risks which persons everywhere take as a
normal part of their lives.”  He explained that cosmic rays are a part of the natural
                                                 
5 William F. Libby received the 1960 Nobel Prize for Chemistry for “his method to use carbon-14 for age
determination in archeology, geology, geophysics, and other branches of science.”
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background radiation and that living one mile above sea level exposes a person to double
the dosage of cosmic rays as living at sea level; therefore, if radiation was such a cancer
risk, there would be cancer epidemics in places like Denver.  In one of his famous risk
comparisons he said, “Living in a brick house, rather than in a wooden house, will, with
certain kinds of bricks in certain parts of the world, increase radiation exposure many
times over that from test fallout.”  This is because some clays contain higher amounts of
radioactive materials.  Libby argued that his standard of concern was “detectable effects.”
Of course, these effects from varying levels of natural background radiation had not been
examined carefully, and when he looked for “any obvious increase in the rate of
occurrence of bone cancer or leukemia,” he did not find any.
Strontium 90 is a radioactive fission product of atomic bombs and the most
dangerous component of fallout.  It is chemically similar to calcium and is incorporated
into bones, which it irradiates, possibly leading to bone and blood cancers.  To evaluate
the risk from strontium 90, Libby compared the dosages from fallout to the Maximum
Permissible Concentration (MPC) allowed atomic energy workers.  Libby asserted that
this MPC standard was set far below the concentration which would produce effects that
could be detectable by the methods of epidemiology, and that it had built in extra margins
of safety.  Libby’s argument was challenged a month later, when scientists, including
Lewis, at the Joint Committee’s Hearings on The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and its
Effects on Man offered repeated concerns about the safety of the MPC standard.
Libby dismissed the moral argument that it was wrong for the nuclear powers to
subject the whole world’s people to the dangers of increased radiation without their
consent and, in most cases, without their knowledge.  He concluded:
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No scientist contends that there is no risk.  We accept risk as payment for
our pleasures, our comforts, and our material progress.  Here the choice
seems much clearer—the terrible risk of abandoning the defense effort
which is so essential under present conditions to the survival of the free
world against the small controlled risk from weapons testing.
Libby held that a “small” risk was acceptable because it was of a similar magnitude to
already accepted “normal” risks.  What he failed to note is that the fallout danger was an
addition to the risk and suffering that were already facts of life for everyone exposed,
including people with nothing to gain from testing [41].
Albert Schweitzer and Linus Pauling disagreed and argued for the value of each
individual life.  If a proponent of nuclear testing argued that the testing would only cause
death to a fraction of a percentage of those exposed, Pauling would multiply those two
numbers, generating an estimate of the total number of individuals who would be killed.
Harrison Brown replied to Libby’s letter in the Saturday Review.  Also a chemist,
Brown was well qualified to engage Libby.  He worked on the Plutonium Project at Oak
Ridge National Laboratory during World War II.  After the war Brown served as
President of Einstein’s Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists which worked to
educate the public about the atomic bomb and to prevent the further development of
nuclear weapons [42].    Brown saw human dignity as a cost of nuclear testing to the
nations whose “actions result indiscriminately in the deaths of persons all over the
world.”  Brown explained that Libby had been convinced from the beginning that H-
bomb tests were necessary and that his approach to the risks had been simply to assume
them to be small, and then find a way to prove it.  When Libby spoke to Brown about his
activism, Libby challenged Brown to prove that the risks were considerable.  Brown
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believed that, given the possible consequences, the burden of proof should fall on the
proponents of testing [43].
In the AEC’s efforts to prove the risks of nuclear testing to be small, they missed
what Brown calls “a really serious danger”:  the danger of inducing leukemia with low-
dosage exposure to radiation.  Brown credited Lewis with uncovering the danger and
directed interested readers to the issue of Science where “Leukemia and Ionizing
Radiation” was published.  His summary of the article focused on Lewis’s conclusion
that natural background radiation must be responsible for a significant fraction of the
world’s leukemia cases and the conclusion that there is no threshold below which
leukemia will not be induced.  Carrying out the estimate, Brown concluded that if testing
stopped immediately, the strontium-90 already released would increase the incidence of
leukemia rate by 0.1 percent; testing continued at the 1957 rate for several decades would
increase it by half a percent; and testing increased to the point where the strontium-90
doses received were equal to one tenth the MPC (the dose declared “safe” for the general
population by the National Academy of Sciences 1956 report) would increase the
leukemia rate by 10 percent.  Brown speculated that someone subscribing to the AEC’s
philosophy might respond with, “This effect is so small that it cannot be detected with
certainty in death statistics.  Clearly the risk is far less than most other risks which we
face as payment for our pleasures, our comfort, or our material progress” [43].  Lewis’s
estimate was particularly powerful because of how definite it was.  An increase in the rate
of leukemia of half a percent is arguably small, but it is also inarguably real.
Following Dr. Libby’s letter to Dr. Schweitzer and Harrison Brown’s response in
the May 25th Saturday Review was an article by the science editor, John Lear, titled “The
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Shrinking Margin.”  He too emphasized the conclusion that the dose of strontium 90 the
AEC considered safe would cause an additional 150 to 3000 Americans to die of
leukemia each year.  After summarizing the Science article, Lear agrees with Graham
DuShane’s editorial “Loaded Dice.”  Science is the official voice of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science and Lear finds it “immensely encouraging
that the AAAS…should be the agency of plain speaking” on the issue of the effects of
fallout radiation.  Lear contends that while the known effects of radiation, including the
increased incidence of leukemia shown by Lewis, are proportionally very small, these
risks should nevertheless be studied and discussed in the decision-making process.
Furthermore, Lear recognized that strontium 90 is only one of many fallout threats, others
include cesium 137 and iodine 131.
Lear proceeded to attack Libby’s science, foreshadowing strikingly similar attacks
on Lewis’s work in the Joint Committee hearings that were still a week away.  Libby
claimed that the danger to a child from a day’s fallout was no more than from the cosmic-
rays received in walking from a seaside beach to the top of a nearby few hundred foot tall
hill.  In searching out Libby’s reasoning, Lear found that, “It amounted to a series of
extrapolations—nothing more positive or definite than that,” and he asked whether that
method was scientific at all.  As if to drive his point home with one final blow, Lear
reminded his readers that, based on growing knowledge, the National Committee on
Radiation reduced the Maximum Permissible Dose from 0.5 r per week in 1935, to 0.3 in
1946, and then to only 0.096 is 1957.  He asked, “Does that threatening procession of
figures make exposure to fallout sound as harmless as a walk uphill from the seaside?”
[44]
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Lewis attended the first meeting of The Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy in
the summer of 1957.  This organization, led by Norman Cousins, worked nationwide to
mobilize public opinion against nuclear testing.  They used the health effects of
radioactive fallout as their central argument for a test ban [45].  Lewis was invited as one
of several “Leaders of America” and gave a summary of his paper.  Lewis believes that
Harrison Brown was instrumental in his invitation.  When Lewis asked Brown how the
travel to New York was to be paid for, Brown covered the expense [26].
The Pauling Bomb-Test Appeal
Linus Pauling also spoke out publicly against nuclear testing.  On May 15th he
launched a petition titled “Bomb-Test Appeal” which expressed the widespread opinion
which had developed within the scientific community that nuclear testing should be
stopped by international agreement.  This scientists’ petition opens,
We, the scientists whose names are signed below, urge that an
international agreement to stop the testing of nuclear bombs be made now.
Each nuclear bomb test spreads an added burden of radioactive elements
over every part of the world.  Each added amount of radiation causes
damage to the health of human beings all over the world and causes
damage to the pool of human germ plasma such as to lead to an increase in
the number of seriously defective children that will be born in future
generations.
The paragraphs which follow address the opportunity to control the spread of nuclear
weapons and, ultimately, to destroy them.  In the final paragraph the authors express their
special motivation as scientists:  “we have knowledge of the dangers involved and
therefore a special responsibility to make those dangers known” [46].
Within two weeks 2,000 American scientists had signed, and Pauling sent the
signed petition to the President on June 4th, 1957.  In the covering letter he asserted that
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there was “essentially unanimous agreement among scientists with experience in the field
of the biological effects of radiation as to the general magnitude of these effects.”  And
he explained that few biological scientists asked to sign the appeal abstained, while many
physicists did, some on the troubling grounds that they had no personal knowledge of the
dangers involved in testing nuclear bombs [47].  In a few months there were 11,021
signatures from forty-nine countries; Pauling presented it to the United Nations believing
that “it represented the feelings of the great majority of the scientists of the world” [46].
One third of the signers were biologists, the scientists who would be most aware of the
biological effects of radiation, 17 percent were physicists, 15 percent were biochemists,
and 14 percent were chemists.  Despite Pauling’s confidence, Robert Divine explains that
the petition did not have the signatures of a majority of leading scientists in the United
States.  Pauling won many critics of his activism and his lack of scientific care in making
estimates of the effects of nuclear weapons testing [38].
Lewis remembers Pauling using his risk estimate for leukemia to extrapolate the
effect to much of the world’s population when he was reluctant to do so [26].  George
Beadle, chairman of the biology division at Caltech, felt that Pauling and those who
signed his petition had overstepped the bounds of their expertise when they claimed to be
speaking in the name of science.  Beadle said that when speaking as regular citizens,
scientists should “make it clear that they are speaking not as experts but are expressing
private opinions” [38, 128].  Lewis is particularly conscious of this concern and careful to
make sure that his public statements can be rigorously defended.
Ray Owen, a biology professor at Caltech and a colleague of Lewis and Pauling,
explained that Pauling had a non-standard way of doing things.  Unlike many scientists
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he was willing to run with ideas until they could be disproved, and he wasn't terribly
concerned about being wrong.  Owen describes Pauling as both freewheeling and a good
scientist [16].  Pauling said that where another scientists might ask, “what do these
experimental observations force us to believe about the nature of the world?” he would
ask, “what is the most simple, general and intellectually satisfying picture of the world
that encompasses these observations and is not incompatible with them?" [16].
Lewis is also a good scientist, but he is both quiet where Pauling was loud and
meticulous where Pauling was freewheeling.  Both made crucial contributions to seeing
the dangers of nuclear testing addressed to which their personalities made them uniquely
suited.   It was Pauling’s method to estimate the total number of individuals impacted by
each nuclear concern and then to publicize these numbers as the human costs of nuclear
testing [48].  From Lewis’s risk estimate he would estimate the number of people who
would die of leukemia as a result of a single nuclear test.  He could not have generated
these powerful numbers without defendable risk estimates to work from.
Pauling was a powerful and articulate spokesman for the cause of ending nuclear
testing.  Many such outspoken activists who had clear political agendas could not, at the
same time, hold the authority of science on related issues.  They relied heavily on the
credibility of Lewis and other scientists who were careful to keep their statements as
much above the political quagmire as possible.  Without both contributions the
movement to end nuclear testing would have been either without a widely heard voice, or
without authority.
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The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Hearings
In the summer of 1956 the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy began a study of
fallout and in March 1957 they announced plans for their hearings on “The Nature of
Radioactive Fallout and its Effects on Man,” which began May 27th and continued for
eight days.  Unlike most congressional hearings, these were carefully structured to get the
facts and opinions out as efficiently as possible.  Chairman of the Special Subcommittee
on Radiation was Chet Holifield, a liberal Democrat from California.  His stated goal was
“to delineate those areas where we have knowledge from those where we have little or no
knowledge, with a view to determining the areas of research which need more intensive
effort” [38, 130].
Robert Divine, author of Blowing On the Wind:  The Nuclear Test Ban Debate
1954-1960, calls the debate over whether or not there exists a threshold below which
radiation does no harm to human beings “the most crucial issue debated at the hearings”
[38, 133].  Lewis served as the major spokesperson against the existence of a threshold
and for the linearity hypothesis.   He was asked to speak to the subject of leukemia and
appeared before the committee on Monday, June 3rd.  Representative Holifield introduced
him and credited him with “a notable scientific background” [29, 955].  In confining his
remarks to leukemia, Lewis was careful to explain that he did not believe leukemia is the
most important effect of radiation on humans; the genetic effects or other cancers could
be more important.  He presented the committee with a linear graph of radiation doses in
rem (essentially equal to the roentgen unit) versus induced leukemia per million persons
per year.  Beside the line are numbered circles which represent the number of cases of
leukemia attributed to the corresponding dosage.  These data points are from the four
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groups Lewis studied in his paper:  A-bomb survivors, radiologists, x-rayed infants (for
thymic enlargement), and x-rayed adults (for ankylosing spondylitis).  Many researchers
had already published tables of the relationship of distance from the atomic explosion to
the incidence of leukemia.  What Lewis added were dosage estimates.
[29, 956]
Lewis pointed out that he had only one small set of data for the low-dose region
(less than 100 rem).  This, of course, is the region most important to the hearings, as
fallout will cause low-dose exposure and the question was whether or not there exists a
threshold dose below which radiation exposures will do no harm.  The available data for
the high dose region supported a linear relationship, but there was not enough data for the
low-dose region to draw conclusions there.  Lewis explained his point:
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The point here, however, is that in the absence of any other information it
seems to me—this is my personal opinion—that the only prudent course is
to assume that a straight-line relationship holds here as well as elsewhere
in the higher dose region. [29, 959]
He explained that there may be a threshold below which leukemia will not develop, but if
so, it must be below 100 rem because you would not expect even six cases beyond
natural background levels below the threshold.
Lewis was asked how many people will die of fallout-induced leukemia each year
in the United States.  Using the conservative estimate of radiation exposure due to fallout
of 0.001 r per year, he calculated that there will be 10 deaths from leukemia per year at
the 1957 rate of fallout, but only 1 to 3 deaths per year at that time because the fallout had
yet to accumulate on the ground, in the food, and in human bodies.  These are very small
numbers.  Lewis still considered them important, “In terms of our population that is a
very minute fraction of the population—an exceedingly minute fraction—but after all, it
does correspond to somebody” [29, 960].
Following Lewis’s testimony were a written statement and his article, “Leukemia
and Ionizing Radiation.”    His statement both summarized the article and carefully
related that analysis to the problem of low-dose, chronic radiation exposure cased by
fallout.  Of the four data sets he analyzed, only radiologists received small doses of
radiation over long periods of time.  They developed leukemia at five times the rate of
non-radiologist MDs with a dose relationship comparable to that of the atomic bomb
survivors.  This means that one can extrapolate from the other data sets because whether
radiation is received all at once or gradually over time is of no consequence to the risk of
leukemia which correlates with total dose.
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Finally, Lewis evaluated the safety standard for strontium-90 of 100 “sunshine
units,” the AEC-named unit for one micromicrocurie of strontium-90 per gram of
calcium, at which it has been assumed that the public would not be affected.  Using the
linearity hypothesis, Lewis calculated that this strontium-90 burden alone will cause
between 500 and one thousand cases of leukemia.6
Lewis was cited numerous times by other scientists testifying before the Joint
Committee.  Muller expressed concern about the lack of publicity that had accompanied
research showing that radiation exposure could shorten lives and weaken health.  He
claimed that evidence showing the proportionality, the linear relationship between the
effects of radiation and the dose, such as Lewis’s work, received even less publicity [29,
1049].
Dr. Walter Selove, chairman of the Federation of American Scientists’ committee
on radiation hazards and associate professor of physics at the University of Pennsylvania,
supported Lewis.  In his statement he explained that the linear relationship had been
shown at high doses of radiation and that it is not certain that the results can be
extrapolated to low doses.  That said, Selove believed that the extrapolation to low doses
                                                 
6 In the summary-analysis report of the hearings, the Joint Committee’s Subcommittee on
Radiation decided to call sunshine units strontium units because the sunshine name
appeared to be intentionally misleading [49].Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, R.S.,
Summary-analysis of Hearings Held May 27-29 and June 3-7, 1957, on the Nature of
Radioactive Fallout and its Effects on Man. 1957, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy:
Washington, D.C..
46
is “a reasonable one” and that Lewis’s results “strongly support the validity of such an
extrapolation in the case of radiation-induced leukemia in man” [29, 1302].
When asked why the safety mark for strontium-90 was set at 100 sunshine units,
Dr. Langham of the Los Alamos Laboratory’s Health Division and co-author of a
comprehensive report on the hazards of strontium-90, explained that it was based on
experiences with radium exposures to researchers.  Lewis’s work would now allow one to
analyze this standard in a new way [29, 774].  Langham and his co-author Ernest C.
Anderson discussed threshold versus non-threshold response in their article titled
“Potential Hazard of World-Wide Sr90 Fallout from Weapons Testing.”  They open with
the statement that it was impossible to know whether or not there was a threshold at that
time.  Lewis is cited as the source for that conclusion, “based on all major sources of
human data,” that there was no threshold.  Austin Brues, director of the Biological and
Medical Research Division of Argonne National Laboratory, is cited for the argument
that the lack of a threshold had not been proven by experiment [29, 1363].  From a public
health point of view, it is remarkable that the burden of proof was placed on the call for
caution, rather than on those who advocated the testing in the face of a lack of
information about its health effects.
Lewis’s work was cited in the Armed Forces Institute for Pathology’s statement
submitted by the director, Captain W. M. Silliphant.  He extrapolates from Lewis’s paper
to say that each roentgen of whole-body radiation absorbed by the nation’s 100 million
people (100 times the amount Lewis believes that the 1957 level of testing would cause)
will eventually lead to 6,000 leukemia cases; and that 100 sunshine or strontium units
would lead to 35,000 cases in this population.   Dr. L. H. Hempelmann of the University
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of Rochester, Strong Memorial Hospital, wrote a review paper titled “Irradiation-Induced
Cancer in Man” examining the published literature on the same groups of radiation-
exposed people as Lewis did his paper.  Hempelmann included a table from Lewis’s
paper showing the summary of his leukemia rate estimates from those populations. His
conclusions were that there is a definite relationship between leukemia and radiation at
high dosages, but that “the data at hand is insufficient to allow us to conclude that this
relationship also holds for low-dose levels” [29, 992-993].
Not everyone put such confidence is Lewis’s work.  Dr. Jacob Furth, President of
the American Association for Cancer Research, had studied leukemia for almost thirty
years.  He wrote,
The statement that there is no threshold injurious dose to somatic cells,
and every irradiation, no matter how small will cause cancer and
leukemia, as is stated by some geneticists, is mere speculation.  This
applies to the statement that even background irradiation is leukemogenic.
The available facts allow argumentation on both sides.  In my opinion, the
statements that background irradiations will induce leukemia are contrary
to observations and the reverse is more likely.  [29, 978]
Dr. Shields Warren, who presented Furth’s statement in his absence, proved to be one of
Lewis’s main adversaries.  Dr. Warren was Director of the Division of Biology and
Medicine of the AEC from 1947 to 1952.  In 1957 he was serving on the AEC’s Advisory
Committee and as a physician pathologist at New Deaconess Hospital in Boston.  In his
testimony he argued that the results in the low-dose region were not statistically
significant.  Lewis later explained that they were significant at the two percent level,
although there were few data points [29].  Instead of choosing to use them for caution’s
sake, Warren stated, “They may provide a guide, but I would not want to base any firm
conclusions on them” [29, 980].
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When Warren said, “I am not at all satisfied that strontium 90 will cause any
additional cases of leukemia,” Senators Bricker and Anderson put him in a corner.
Anderson reminded Warren of Lewis’s assertion that background radiation was
responsible for some fraction of leukemia cases.  Warren replied that he knew of no way
to “establish or prove” that assertion.  When pushed he conceded that it was “a fair and
reasonable assumption” but added, “I do not think we are warranted in accepting it as an
established fact.”  Bricker described Lewis’s assumption as nothing more than an
educated guess.  Anderson followed, asking Warren:  “When you say, also, that one
microcurie or one-tenth of a microcurie is a safe background, that is also an educated
guess, it is not?”  Warren’s first reply was no, then he conceded, “I feel—well, yes it is an
educated guess” [29, 1327].  This was one of many occasions when those defending
nuclear testing demanded a higher level of evidence from those people advising caution
than they required to backup their own risk taking.
The Roundtable Discussion
On June 3rd H. L. Friendell of Western Reserve University’s School of Medicine,
Austin Brues, Edward Lewis, Hardin Jones of the University of California Radiation
Laboratory, Ernest Pollard of Yale’s Biophysics Department, and Shields Warren were
invited and participated in a discussion on the day’s testimony at the conference table.
Representative Holifield invited Lewis to begin the discussion over the disagreement
between his testimony and Dr. Furth’s testimony.  Furth’s testimony included the
statement that “All reported experiments of leukemia induction by irradiation have
pointed to the existence of a threshold and none suggested the lack of it.”  But the
opening discussion focused on the data on the life spans of radiologists.  (Dr. Furth was
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president of the American Association for Cancer Research and his statement was
presented in his absence by Dr. Warren.)
Dr. Brues presented a critical analysis of Lewis’s scientific evidence by
describing three hypothetical experiments with mice.  He finished,
Then there is the third situation where you do an experiment, having to do
with a certain situation, and you transfer the results of that quite a
distance.  You demonstrate a certain percentage of life shortening at a high
level, and you guess from this that you will see a certain amount at the low
level which it would be impossible to ever detect.  Or you study it in the
mouse and you multiply the result by the difference in the life spans, and
you come out again with a figure.  When this is mixed up with
mechanisms that you have no way of looking at, it becomes a little more
speculative.
I find personally that Dr. Lewis’ figures are extremely interesting and
suggestive.  I think that probably some of the warmth of the statements
that have come out in relation to this are owing to what some people have
perhaps done to Dr. Lewis’ work, saying that so many leukemias will be
produced under certain conditions.  I think if we look at it that way, we are
perhaps a little less in danger of over weighting our thoughts on the side of
radiation hazards and forgetting a lot of other things that are important and
related.  [29, 1002]
Dr. Jones followed with support for Lewis.  Jones called Lewis’ work a very good
reconstruction of the available data.   He agreed with Lewis that “everything we can test
critically here suggests the idea of proportionality,” and then went on to explain that
Lewis’ estimate was a conservative one and that the incidence of leukemia caused by
radiation could be much higher [29, 1002-1003].
Dr. Friedell contended that there simply was not enough data in the low-dose
region to make a threshold impossible and compared the somatic mutation hypothesis,
which says that one ray of radiation can damage a cell and cause cancer, to a hypothetical
hypothesis for cyanide damage.  He claimed that radiation must be like other toxic
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substances in that the body must have effective ways to nullify small quantities of toxins
[29, 1003].
Lewis responded by revisiting the Hiroshima and Nagasaki data, and explaining
that Friedell’s assumption was simply contrary to the available human data on radiation
effects.
Dr. Pollard did not think like a toxicologist.  He called the linearity hypothesis
both “very reasonable” and “rational.”  From his perspective the policy on radiation
should be based on it until it is proven not to be the case because of the risks involved.
He says, “If later on it seems there is a threshold, then we are not too badly off.  But if
there is not a threshold, and we bet there is one, we are in trouble” [29, 1004].
Dr. Warren thought that policy should not be made so protectively; rather, he
argued, it should be based on the most probable situation, which he believed to be the
threshold scenario.  Warren did not “regard the complete linearity of the induction of
leukemia as in the range of reasonable probability.”
Lewis brought the group back to the problems of the day; he explained that “the
danger comes in legislating a dose that his said to be permissible for the public.”  He had
the last word that day, arguing that the public should be told that a certain number of
people would likely still be hurt under a permissible dose.
Finally, for the record, Representative Holifield confirmed that the scientists had
all been speaking about the type of radiation associated with fallout and closed the
session.
The hearings are printed in two volumes totaling 2000 pages.  Accompanying
them is a 19-page summary report.  The question of a threshold features prominently in
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this short summary.  The report asks if there is a safe dose of radiation or a threshold and
concludes that an answer would be difficult to find using experiments.  The report
discusses possible dose-response curves.  A linear relationship is based on the
experimental data and on the somatic mutation theory.  The testimony for a threshold was
based on two contentions.  The first was that the ability of biological organisms to repair
damage to themselves must create a threshold, below which biological repair would
reverse the damage.  The second was the assertion that because many different
mechanisms can lead to cancer, it is not possible to draw conclusions about the existence
of a proportional relationship.  The biological effects of low doses of radiation were
discussed for two days and little agreement was reached.  The report calls the existence of
a threshold “the great unknown in the field of nongenetic biological effects of radiation”
[49].
Press coverage of the hearings
Before the biological effects of radiation at low doses had been discussed at the
hearings, Professor George Beadle of Caltech explained the major disagreements among
the some scientists could be traced to their different evaluations of the role of nuclear
weapons [21].  Beadle was concerned about the activist positions against nuclear testing
of scientists like Pauling and Brown who believed that nuclear weapons were a grave
threat to the earth and international security.  At the opposite pole, scientists like Edward
Teller believed that the Soviet threat to the national security of the United States made
developing and testing nuclear weapons a necessity.  Neither of these positions could be
evaluated scientifically [38, 322].  However, some scientists, including Sturtevant and
Lewis, did not take on activist campaigns. They believed that the pressing need was for
52
good information based on scientific work that was not driven by ideology which those
elected into politics could use to carefully weigh the costs and benefits of their decisions
[26].
On June 3rd, the day after the sessions on the biological effects of fallout, Warren
Unna of the Washington Post published an article that addressed both genetic and
somatic hazards, titled “All Radiation Held Perilous:  Nation’s Top Geneticists
Unanimous in Opinion.”  Unna pointed out the AEC’s history of withholding
information, particularly a report on the effects of strontium-90.  He quoted Sturtevant’s
challenge that the AEC should respond to the scientists’ careful presentation with a
“detailed and objective statement of the reasons for continued testing” [50].
On June 10th Life Magazine featured a troubling article on the hearings, titled “A
Searching Inquiry Into Nuclear Perils.”  It opened with photos of manikins wearing gas
masks juxtaposed with the worried faces of senators on the radiation subcommittee.  Two
pages later is a photo spread of scientists who are engaged discussing and researching the
fallout question.  Lewis sits in front of a blackboard covered in statistical calculations
with the caption,
WARNING OF DANGER was sounded by Dr. E. B. Lewis of Caltech.  In
an article in Science he proved that there is a direct relationship between
radiation and leukemia.  He predicts a five to 10 percent increase in
leukemia if strontium-90 level in humans reaches a figure which the AEC
still considers harmless.  [51]
In a diagram and a few short paragraphs, the authors explain the path of strontium 90
from nuclear detonations to human beings.  The article’s dramatic conclusion is a full
page photograph of an embattled Nevada rancher who believes the tests are harmful.
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Norman Cousins continued to participate in the debate over nuclear testing with
his editorials in the Saturday Review and as one of the central leaders of SANE.  “The
Great Debate Opens” was the title of Cousins’ two-page June 15th editorial on the
Congressional hearings.  He summarized the arguments of those scientists who opposed
nuclear testing in terms of the unknown nature of man’s tolerance limits for radiation, the
fact that each additional piece of research seemed to show radiation to be “vastly more
dangerous than was previously supposed,” and the recent research that “definitely
indicates a small increase in the world leukemia rate which is directly attributable to the
explosions.”  Moving to the argument for nuclear testing, Cousins pointed out that both
the American and Russian nuclear arsenals had the capacity to destroy the world.  How,
under these circumstances, can creating bigger bombs be of use to national security [52]?
On July 6th Cousins wrote “An Open Letter to David Lawrence,” editor of U.S.
News & World Report, in response to an article titled “What’s Back of the ‘Fall-Out’
Scare” published by his magazine.  The article had accused those speaking out against
nuclear testing, including Pope Pius XII and Dr. Schweitzer, of being influenced by
Communists.  Cousins explained that these men held legitimate and sincere concerns for
the health of all people and that they were not singling out or attempting to politically
disadvantage the United States [53].  A week later he criticized the celebration of the
“clean” bomb idea.  To him “clean” bombs would only be covering up the immorality of
“dirty” wars [54].  Two weeks later, Cousins included those men who were “chronic
absentees” from being “supremely aware of and intimately involved in the great issues”
of their time in his “Checklist of Enemies” [55].
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A mushroom cloud served as the backdrop to the quote “We are dealing with a
global health problem.  We must face up to it,” on the cover of the August 3rd, 1957
Saturday Review.   Both the article “Who Should Judge the Atom?” and the quote written
by Representative Chet Holifield, who chaired the congressional hearings on radiation.
In explaining what the committee learned, he stressed that fallout radiation was a new,
manmade hazard.  In his discussion of strontium-90, Holifield explained the need for
“worry limits” and “yardsticks” which relate to them.  The AEC had not been helpful in
establishing these markers and measures.  Their party line seemed to be to “play it
down,” and in discussion they offered only estimates of where to begin to worry, not of
what the upper limits might be.  Even worse, the AEC had been covering up some of the
dangers by not releasing information and by hiding its study of strontium 90 under the
cheery name Project Sunshine.  Holifield called on the president of the United States to
ask the advice of scientists.  Beyond this he called upon the expert scientists of the world
to join together in open discussion and come up with a set of standards for radiation risks
[56].  Lewis, whose work was heavily referenced, was an important member of this
discussion.
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Chapter 4:  The responses
Pauling’s No More War!
In August 1958 Linus Pauling published his book No More War!7  Pauling’s
thesis was that nuclear weapons have made war prohibitively costly and therefore it must
be avoided.  The task of the book was to delineate the costs of nuclear war.  In his chapter
on “Radiation and Disease”, Pauling summarized Lewis’s “Leukemia and Ionizing
Radiation.”   Pauling credited the analysis as the “most significant direct information
about whether or not small doses of radiation produce cancer in the irradiated human
being” [57, 90].   Further, he called Lewis’s leukemia estimate of 2 _10-6 per roentgen per
year “the best value available.”  Additionally, he compares this value with the
independent estimate of Mazumdar and Nagaratnam which was 3 _10-6 per roentgen per
year [29, 1685].  On the question of a threshold, Pauling believed that the geneticists
working on the mechanisms of disease had the best information and that they were
correct in believing that no threshold exists for the induction by radiation of leukemia and
bone cancer.  Furthermore, he pointed out that even if there is a threshold it may be low
enough to be of no consequence because, in this scenario, the added exposure from bomb
testing would push many individuals over that line.
In discussing the hazards of strontium 90, Pauling used Lewis’ estimate to make
an extrapolation to the world population.  Pauling calculated the leukemia deaths per year
expected for the whole world due to a steady state of bomb testing at what was then the
current rate of tests.  According to his extrapolation, 8,000 people on Earth would die of
leukemia for each year of nuclear testing [57, 104].
                                                 
7It is said that Pauling dictated the book while driving to his vacation ranch on the California coast 48.
Lewis, E.B., e-mail, J. Caron, Editor. 2002: Pasadena..
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Lewis was reluctant to make such a broad extrapolation.  He thought that by
including the entire population of the Earth Pauling had inflated the number of people
who were likely to be exposed by the fallout and therefore that his estimates were
exaggerated [26].  (In fact, testimony at the Joint Committee hearings had explained that
upper atmosphere winds and weather patterns would keep most of the fallout in the
northern hemisphere.)  Pauling concluded the chapter with the strong statement, “I
believe that the nations of the world that are carrying out the tests of nuclear weapons are
sacrificing the lives of hundreds of thousands of people now living and of hundreds of
thousands of unborn children, and that this sacrifice is unnecessary” [57, 111]
Kimball’s “Evaluation of Data Relating Human Leukemia and Ionizing Radiation”
In the August 1958 Journal of the National Cancer Institute, A. W. Kimball
published an article titled “Evaluation of Data Relating Human Leukemia and Ionizing
Radiation” criticizing the strength of Lewis’s statistical assertions [58].  Kimball was a
statistician at Oak Ridge, the national laboratory where radioactive uranium was
processed for the atomic bombs.  Lewis wrote Pauling a short and undated memo about
another article by Kimball, and in a parenthetical note he discussed Kimball’s critical
article.  He describes it as “a very objectionable criticism of my Science article,” and
says,
The tone of it is that I have employed statistics incorrectly and so as to
give an aura of authenticity to my paper and that this has served to dupe
others—the meaning of this being DuShane and yourself—into believing
there was something to the linearity hypothesis.  There is a long
background to this article by Kimball which I will tell you about some
time.  [59]
Kimball argues that Lewis did not prove the linearity hypothesis because the
available data were “insufficient to support any conclusion about the shape of the dose-
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response curve, particularly in the low-dose region.”  Only in the second to last paragraph
did Kimball note that Lewis never claimed to have proven the hypothesis.  Kimball
charged that Lewis’s analysis must be treated with caution as the data were “selected
retrospectively” for radiation exposure and may “be misleading when interpreted without
regard for pitfalls that are frequently present” in such evidence.  He was, however,
comparing this data with what would be gathered in a controlled laboratory experiment
on a randomly selected sample of a population, an experiment that would never be
possible on human beings.  Quoting DuShane’s editorial “Loaded Dice,” Kimball claims
that some scientists had taken Lewis’s work as proof of the non-existence of a threshold,
and his intention is to establish that the data were “insufficient to support definite
conclusions.”
“The real point at issue,” according to Kimball, is the existence of a threshold
dose.  Kimball says that the justifiability of the statistical assumptions inherent in Lewis’s
analysis is susceptible to reasonable doubt.  His discussion of “recognizable” sources of
error and the statistical techniques involved is “intended to establish such doubt.”
Kimball is concerned with several categories of errors:  errors in the data collection,
dosimetry errors, errors due to sampling bias, truncation errors, and random errors.  His
concerns about dosimetry, sampling bias, and truncation are the most interesting; in
contrast, his comments about data collection and random errors amount to little more than
the acknowledgement of these general sources of concern in scientific studies.
For both Hiroshima and Nagasaki Lewis used the same estimation of dose based
on the distance of each individual from the hypocenter of the atomic explosion.
Hiroshima had been hit with a uranium bomb, while the bomb used on Nagasaki was
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made with plutonium.  These two bombs were different and yielded different amounts of
neutron and gamma radiation. Furthermore, the two cities were topographically different.
Kimball argues that it would have been more accurate to use dose-distance curves
constructed separately for each city and to have broken down the neutron and gamma
radiation contributions.  Kimball criticizes the conclusions Lewis drew from the other
data sets by claming that it cannot be assumed that acute and chronic doses have the same
effect on the genesis of leukemia.  He claims that “if one considers all aspects of the
dosimetry problem, it should be clear that the apparent agreement among the calculated
leukemia rates per individual per year per rad for the four sets of data may be highly
fortuitous.”
In his attempt to create doubt about sampling bias, Kimball tells readers that
although there is no evidence for a correlation between ankylosing spondylitis or thymic
enlargement and leukemia, except for the radiation treatments, “it would be difficult to
state categorically that no such correlations exist.”  The data could also be subject to
truncation errors.  If irradiated populations die earlier than unirradiated populations, as in
animal studies, then looking for the number of leukemia deaths in each population when
more irradiated people had died than unirradiated people could lead to a bias.  Kimball
cites animal studies of leukemia induction by radiation to argue that the incidence of
leukemia would be greater in the population that died earlier than it would prove to be
once the cause of death was known for the entire exposed population.  This bias toward
an increased incidence of leukemia would not be present if you could wait to gather data
until all members of the population in question had died.  While such a study might be of
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future interest, the immediate need for information to which Lewis was responding would
not allow it.
 Kimball did find one indisputable error in Lewis’s paper.  The confidence limits
Lewis believed were 95 percent were actually 90 percent limits.  Lewis had used a
mislabeled reference table to calculate the limits, and he unknowingly carried over the
error [26].
Kimball concludes that Lewis’s risk estimate is “open to serious question” and
that the available evidence is “insufficient” to support either the threshold or linearity
hypothesis.  He notes, in the second to last paragraph of his very critical paper, that
“Lewis has avoided stating the definite conclusion that there is no threshold dose.”  The
last paragraph is very interesting.  Kimball attempts to clear himself of advocating a point
of view opposite to that of Lewis.  He says of his article that,
In reality its only purpose is to emphasize the shaky grounds on which any
definite conclusion would be based.  Nothing that is said here should be
taken as an argument supporting the hypothesis of a threshold dose for the
induction of leukemia by ionizing radiation.  An attempt to use the same
data to establish a threshold would be open to similar criticism.  [58]
After concluding that the available evidence leaves him in the dark about the
shape of the dose-response curve for ionizing radiation and leukemia, Kimball ends his
paper, “We can only hope that scientists working on this critical problem will soon
provide us with adequate evidence.”  One wonders what evidence Kimball would
consider “sufficient” and “adequate” for drawing conclusions.  Here we are reminded of
Lewis’s crucial argument at the Joint Committee Hearings’ roundtable.  If it is not
possible to know for sure what the risks are to the health of large numbers of people, is it
not prudent to take the most cautious approach possible?
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Brues’s “Critique of the Linear Theory of Carcinogenesis”
On April 30, 1958, Graham DuShane wrote Lewis to let him know, among other
things, that Austin Brues, Director of Argonne National Laboratory and a radiobiologist,
would be submitting a paper criticizing “Leukemia and Ionizing Radiation”.  This paper,
“Critique of the Linear Theory of Carcinogenesis:  Present data on human
leukemogenesis by radiation indicate that a nonlinear relation is more probable,” was
published in Science on September 26th.   The paper is a review of the literature and
contains no new data.  Brues seeks to cast doubt on the linearity hypothesis by
reinterpreting the available data and looking at some of the other mechanisms that could
be responsible for cancer.
It is useful to remember Lewis’s arguments before approaching the details of
Brues’s paper.  Lewis came to linearity from the data, not from the somatic mutation
hypothesis [33], [48].  He considered the finding that the probability of leukemia per
individual per rad per year was almost the same over the wide range of dosages received
by the atomic bomb survivors and the ankylosing spondylitis patients, “presumptive
evidence” that the dose response curve was linear or approximately linear.
In the next paragraph of his paper, “Leukemia and Ionizing Radiation,” Lewis
said that this linear relationship “suggested by the available data for man, may have its
explanation in a somatic mutation hypothesis.”  Furthermore, he explained that the
available hypotheses for radiation-induced cancers were “by no means mutually
exclusive.”  Why did Lewis choose to discuss this hypothesis?  Because the data yielded
a linear dose-response curve and, as a geneticist, he was aware that gene mutation was
known to be linearly proportional to dosage, even when the radiation was received
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gradually, rather than in one large dose.  At no point in his paper does Lewis assume that
all cancer, or even all leukemia, is caused by somatic mutations.  Nor does he assume that
the risk estimate he has derived for radiation-induced leukemia applies equally to
everyone.  Instead, he explains that it applies to the “average” individual and that some
people are likely to be more or less susceptible [33].
Brues sees things differently from square one.  Lewis is working from his
background in genetics.  The first point Brues makes is that the existence of a threshold is
usually taken for granted in toxicology.  In analyzing the human evidence Brues found
that those few individuals who were more than 1625 meters from the hypocenters of the
atomic bombs and later developed leukemia were probably exposed to more than the
dosage estimated by the distance, because they suffered acute radiation symptoms after
the bombings.  Therefore, where Lewis estimated that these survivors received doses
averaging 50 rem, Brues concluded that they must have received at least 100 rad, which
means that Lewis had less low-dose data than he estimated.
Brues also reanalyzed Court-Brown and Doll’s research on ankylosing spondylitis
patients.  These authors concluded that a linear relation without a threshold was a good
“working hypothesis.”  Brues disagreed.  In his analysis he found a curvilinear relation
from the mean doses to the spinal marrow and an approximately linear relation “only by
discarding those cases in which extra spinal irradiation was also given.”   Therefore, he
claims that “present data on human leukemogenesis by radiation fail to indicate a linear
relation between dose and effect” [60].
Brues goes on to examine experimental studies of carcinogenesis in animals.  At
the Joint Committee hearings a year earlier, he expressed what most scientists would
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consider unreasonable standards for what can be called “scientific.”  Among other
examples, he said that irradiating one kind of mice and inferring that another species of
mouse would behave in the same way is “not quite so scientific of a route” [29, 1002].  In
1958 Brues was less picky about what could disprove a hypothesis.  He looked at
experiments with carcinogenesis in animals.  Some of the studies he cites use radiation,
others use chemical carcinogens, and of more than half a dozen studies, none deals with
leukemia specifically.  Because none of these animal studies, mainly of tumors, shows a
linear relationship with dosage, Brues would like to rule out the linear relationship that
Lewis and Court-Brown and Doll believe they found in human beings.
Continuing along the same vein, Brues argues that because the somatic mutation
hypothesis does not appear to be a plausible explanation of many cancers, mutation
somehow cannot be the source of radiation-induced leukemias.  Brues says, “I feel,
however, that the burden of proof must rest on those who are attracted to the somatic
point-mutation hypothesis because of its superficial simplicity.”  He proposes five
alternate hypotheses for the source of carcinogenesis.  But since the purpose of his paper
is simply to cast doubt, he is merely throwing alternative out ideas without careful
evaluation.
 Brues summarizes his claims:  1) that the human data don’t support linearity, 2)
that no carcinogenic agent has been shown to have a linear dose-response relation, and
leukemia should not be an exception, 3) that a cancer-inducing mutation must, by the
numbers, be extremely improbable, and 4) that there cannot be a linear relationship if
multiple events or a disordered tissue state are required for leukemogenesis.  On these
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grounds Brues “deduced” that a linear dose-response between radiation and leukemia
“seems most improbable.”
Why did Brues, director of the Department of Energy’s Argonne National
Laboratory, write this article?  The first sentence of the discussion section may hold the
answer:  “It has been suggested that strontium-90 from fallout might be linearly
responsible for a very low (but in absolute numbers, appreciable) incidence of leukemia.”
Brues is very defensive when he says that the evidence presented against linearity at low
doses is only “illustrative,” but, he claims, he has discussed the evidence for linearity
“rather completely” [60].
Lewis did not respond to the critical papers
Lewis did not respond to Kimball or Brues.  When their articles were published,
Lewis was doing research, teaching genetics, managing Caltech’s Drosophila collection,
and had three sons at home.  The journals wanted responses right away and he was too
busy, too tired, and too exhausted from all the attention generated by “Leukemia and
Ionizing Radiation” and the Joint Committee hearings.  Lewis writes,
I should have answered the letters to Science but as usual the journal
wanted an immediate response from me and I don't dash stuff off easily. 
Aside from using confidence limits from a table in a book that were wrong
(90% instead of 95%), there was no substance to any of it and the claim
that leukemia deaths would not be a Poisson variable is wrong and papers
in the field are now careful to point out that it is Poisson.  The number of
deaths from leukemia in the USA per month are tabulated in the national
data bases and it turns out that it almost perfectly predicts the number of
days in the month Feb lowest, 30 and 31 days come out surprisingly well. 
I did that years ago and should have written a note about it.  [35]
More than thirty years later Sir Richard Doll dismissed Brues and supported
Lewis in a guest editorial in the British Journal of Cancer.  In “Hazards of ionizing
radiation: 100 years of observations on man” Doll explains that the increased risk of
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cancer “came gradually to be accepted as due to one or more somatic mutations partly as
the result of epidemiological observations in the mid 1950s (Court Brown and Doll,
1957; Lewis 1957) but even as late as 1960, it continued to be resisted by some
distinguished radiobiologists (Brues, 1960)” [2].
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Chapter 5:  Conclusions
Lewis’s later work on radiation
After the Joint Committee hearings, Lewis was asked to serve on the National
Advisory Committee on Radiation.  The committee was established by Dr. LeRoy E.
Burney, the Surgeon General.  According to his son, Abel Wolman, a sanitary engineer [a
public health specialist in sanitation] from Johns Hopkins University, initiated the
formation of the committee.  Wolman saw a need for an expert committee that brought
together diverse experts who were not part of the radiation establishment.  The committee
reported to the Surgeon General and was under the umbrella of the Public Health Service;
it had no statutory authority [61, 250-251].  The first meeting was held in Washington
DC on March 13, 1958 [62].  On the committee were physicians, public-health officials,
geneticists, a scientist from the AEC’s Brookhaven National Laboratory, and Lauriston
Taylor of the National Bureau of Standards and the National Council on Radiation
Protection.  Russell H. Morgan, chairman of the committee, was a professor of radiology
at Johns Hopkins Medical School and radiologist-in-chief at Johns Hopkins Hospital [61,
251].  Members of the committee included Wolman, Lewis, and James Crow, an
outspoken geneticist from the University of Wisconsin.  Arnold Beckman, president of
Beckman Instruments and a Caltech alumnus, was on the committee for the purpose of
representing the radiation instruments industry; according to Lewis’s memory, he never
said a word [63].
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National Advisory Committee on Radiation, first meeting, Washington, DC. Front
row: far left Edward Lewis, far right Arnold Beckman, Back row: far left, Abel Wolman.
Mar. 13, 1958.
Courtesy of the Caltech Archives PhotoNet Photo ID 1.2.02-9
A year after its formation, the Committee suggested that the “ultimate authority”
for protecting the public from nuclear radiation be removed from the AEC and vested in
the Public Health Service.  The Committee recognized that the AEC had been given the
dual responsibilities of regulating and promoting nuclear power and called this structure
“unwise.”  Promotion was clearly winning at the expense of public health and this
organizational structure was unwise.  The next month President Eisenhower ordered a
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study by “high Federal officials to determine which Government body shall be
responsible for protecting the public against atomic radiation” [64, 308-309] [61, 251-
253].
In 1959 Lewis found reason to challenge another AEC assumption.  It had been
assumed that absorbed doses of radiation averaged over yearly periods and large
populations would be significantly below the natural background doses.  Lewis found this
to be far from the case for radioactive iodine, predominantly iodine-131, in infants and
children in the United States.  Lewis used data on the radioiodine content in milk for five
major US milk sheds from March 1957 to September 1958, estimates of milk
consumption, and estimates of the fraction of radioiodine taken up by the thyroid by age
group.  Infants received about 18 times the thyroid dose of radiation received by adults.
Lewis found that infants and children received an average dose from radioiodine
generated by nuclear tests equal to one to two times the corresponding natural
background radiation dose [65].
Lewis worried that this paper would “meet review problems in Science” because
it was such a charged topic and the AEC had put pressure on the editors after “Leukemia
and Ionizing Radiation” in 1957.  Instead of trying to publish in Science, Sturtevant
submitted it to the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences; which, at that time,
accepted articles directly from NAS members without further review.  Looking back,
Lewis said, “Probably a mistake, but by then I was not sure Science would take it and I
felt it needed publication to counter some of the AEC claims about fallout levels” [26].
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Edward B. Lewis with Drosophila, 1960
Courtesy of the Caltech Archives PhotoNet Photo ID 10.24-181
In 1962 Lewis again offered a statement at Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
Hearings.  In his statement he focused on the danger of thyroid cancer in children from
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fallout exposure, estimating that 1600 United States children would develop thyroid
cancer as a product of the nuclear testing.  He explains this estimate:
Over the last five years it may be surmised that about 40,000,000 children
(under ten) in the U.S. have experienced an average total accumulated
dose from the radioiodines in fallout that is equal to about 0.2 to 0.4 rad.
If such individuals experience the same probability of thyroid cancer per
year per rad as the infants in the thymus-irradiated series [those treated for
enlarged thymus glands with radiation], then some 80 to 1600 cases of
thyroid cancer might be expected to develop over the lifetimes of these
40,000,000 individuals.  The number of cases predicted in this way is seen
to be a small percentage of the total number of individuals involved.
However, neither total number of cases nor the percentage they represent
of the total population are adequate measures of the extent of human
suffering which would be involved.  These numerical estimates have been
presented merely in order to give some idea of the magnitude of the
damage which might result in the U.S. from the radioiodine release in past
weapons tests.  [66] [emphasis in original]
The linear versus threshold debate was continued at these Joint Committee
Hearings, so Lewis evaluated the radioiodine risk in both scenarios.  He concluded that in
this case a linear relationship to dose might yield a lower estimate of the number of
individuals affected than a threshold relationship.
If there is a threshold for the induction of thyroid cancer and if this
threshold has not yet been exceeded, then no cases of thyroid cancer may
trace to fallout from past weapons tests.  On the other hand, there have
been extremely wide variations in radioiodine levels, with time and with
locality, which will have to be taken into account before it can be said
even on the threshold hypothesis that no damage could have resulted from
past tests.  Moreover, many children receive doses of medical X-rays that
are near if not over the threshold dose for the induction of thyroid
malignancy and on the threshold hypothesis these individuals are those
most sensitive to the added radiation from fallout.  On the linear
hypothesis it is the average dose over the entire population of the U.S.
which is important and local hot spots do not then have the alarming
significance that is often attributed to them nor, from the linear hypothesis,
does the individual who receives a large dose of radiation need to be
alarmed, since the individual's probability of developing a malignancy
remains relatively low even after heavy dose exposures.  [66]
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With this last scenario, that of individuals receiving radiation in the course of medical
treatment, Lewis demonstrated that risk estimates can provide reason for alarm or for
confidence, and sometimes for both.
On December 13, 1963 Lewis published a more in-depth study of leukemia
among radiologists in Science, which built on the one in his 1957 paper “Leukemia and
Ionizing Radiation.”  Lewis looked at the death certificates of 425 radiologists who died
between 1948 and 1961 and found increased incidences of leukemia, multiple myeloma,
and aplastic anemia when compared to the incidences among the larger population of
white males in the United States [67].  Furthermore, he established for the first time that
these increased incidences were not the result of radiologists receiving better diagnosis
than other Americans.  To do this he used the discovery by Court-Brown and Doll that
one common form of leukemia, chronic lymphatic leukemia (CLL), was not induced by
ionizing radiation.  If the increased incidence of leukemia in radiologists was an artifact
of diagnosis, then one would expect to see a proportional rise in CLL cases, which Lewis
did not find [30].
In 1998 Lewis presented a review paper titled “Ionizing Radiation, Cancer
Induction and Radioactive Fallout” at the international conference The Discovery of
Polonium and Radium—its scientific and philosophical consequences, benefits, and
threats to mankind.  In this paper he discussed,
a) how important discoveries over the last 100 years help to quantify the
risk of cancer in populations exposed to man-made sources of ionizing
radiation, and
b) how periodic episodes of contamination of the environment with
radioactive elements have created public health problems
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Looking back on the years of nuclear testing with his knowledge of the cancer-
inducing effect of radioiodine on the thyroid glands of children, Lewis wrote:
In some areas of the US, it would probably have been wise to try to reduce
the thyroid dose by limiting the intake of contaminated milk.  However,
the hazard was not recognized by the US Atomic Energy Commission,
which assured the public that fallout doses were far below natural
background levels (0.1 rem per year).
Lewis warned that more could have been done to protect the victims of Chernobyl
from fallout, especially the infants and children from radioiodine.  He concluded that, in
this nuclear age, governments and societies need to be better prepared to deal with future
releases of radioactive fallout [4].
The threshold debate remains unresolved.  Lewis discussed the evidence for
linearity in the “Epidemiology of cancer induction” subsection of his 1998 review and
notes that the United States National Academy of Science (1990) and UN (1994)
committees on radiation found cancers in addition to leukemia with approximately linear
dose-response curves.  Apparently no firm conclusions about the effects of low doses of
radiation can be established.  In the summary of this review, Lewis simply stated that
“certain cancers are induced by relatively high doses at a rate that is linearly proportional
to the dose,” citing Muller’s 1937 paper on the issue [4].  He explained:
Science cannot claim absolute truth and this allows people to make
extreme statements that a threshold dose can never be ruled out.  In
practice it can be a moot point if everyone exceeds the threshold dose if
that dose is below that received from natural background sources of
ionizing radiation.  [48]
While the scientific debate on whether the induction of leukemia by radiation has
a linear or threshold relationship to dose remains uncertain, Lewis is confident that the
relationship is linear.  One reason he gives is that usually in biology if there is a threshold
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below which a biological system can compensate for a damaging agent, then once the
threshold is met, the incidence of damage or disease increases exponentially, not linearly.
In the case of leukemia and radiation it clearly increases linearly into the high dose range.
Even if the relationship is not linear, Lewis argues, the threshold has been exceeded [25].
Watson and Crick published the structure of DNA in 1953.  Molecular biology
was in its infancy during the fallout debate of the late fifties.  Almost half a century later,
a great deal has been discovered and it is a well developed field of study.  Lewis is
further convinced that the relationship between leukemia and radiation is linear because
of the action of radiation on DNA.
The reason I am convinced that there is no threshold is that cancers such
as leukemia are known to be the result of somatic mutations. The
absorption of a single quantum of radiation results in a track of ionizing
particles that is long enough to delete up to several thousands DNA base
pairs. Such lesions can therefore lead to a gene mutation and if in a bone
marrow cell can transform it into a leukemic cell.   Such lesions also
cannot be easily repaired nor is there any known way that such repair can
be 100% effective.  Obviously in the case of induced cancers (namely
those significantly in excess of the expected number), the DNA repair
process must have failed.  [48]
Although the biological effects of radiation are not the predominant focus of
Lewis’s scientific career, he continues to be concerned with the impact of radiation
exposure on human health.  Lewis has convinced several members of the Caltech faculty
to accept dental x-rays less frequently than suggested by their dentists.  In addition, he
has pushed for an increase in the suggested age at which women should have
mammogram screenings because his calculations show that the risks associated with the
x-rays outweigh the expected benefits of the early detection of breast cancer at 40 years
of age.
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The Limited Nuclear Test Ban
A voluntary moratorium on atmospheric testing was initiated by the Soviet
government in 1958 and lasted for three years.  Intense efforts of diplomats, scientists,
and activists were underway during this time to create an enforceable ban on all nuclear
testing.  The Soviets resumed testing on September 1, 1961 and the United States
followed suit two weeks later.  1962 was the most intense year of testing for both
countries.  Finally, the pursuit of a detection system which could observe all underground
and outer space tests was abandoned and the compromise solution was to ban
atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons and consequently end the creation of nuclear
fallout.
The Limited Nuclear Test Ban was signed into law on Aug. 5, 1963 by the US,
Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.  The agreement banned nuclear tests in the oceans,
in the atmosphere, and in outer space [38].  The Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy
was credited with building a substantial grassroots movement to end nuclear testing.
They chose to use the health effects of fallout as their central argument for a test ban.
Included in their campaign of full paged advertisements were “Is this what it’s coming
to?” with a photo of a milk bottle labeled with poison cross bones, and “Your children’s
teeth contain Strontium-90” with a photo of smiling kids [45].  Their approach would not
have been viable without the work of scientists like Lewis who researched the hazards of
radioactive elements.
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Edward B.  Lewis (no date)
Courtesy of the Caltech Archives PhotoNet Photo ID 10.24-82
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Trinity, the first atomic detonation
August 6
The bombing of Hiroshima
August 9
The bombing of Nagasaki
1946
Harrison Brown, professor of geochemistry at Caltech, published Must Destruction Be
Our Destiny?  A Scientist Speaks as a Citizen arguing for international control of nuclear
weapons.
1950
The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory published The Effects of Atomic Weapons:
Prepared for and in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission.  While this document includes significant discussion of the




Britain tested its first atomic bomb
November 1




BRAVO hydrogen bomb test by the AEC begins the AEC CASTLE series.
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July-August
Lewis published “The Theory and Application of a New Method of Detecting




Sturtevant’s Pacific Division of the AAAS Presidential speech on the “Social
implications of the genetics of man.”
1955
January
Sturtevant published “The Genetic Effects of High Energy Irradiation of human
populations” in the Caltech magazine, Engineering and Science (E&S).
February 15
The AEC released its report on fallout from the March 1st, 1954 H-Bomb test, BRAVO.
February 18-May 25
Operation TEACUP tests in Nevada
July 8
Beadle sent a memo on “Possible direct effects on man of low level exposures to ionizing
radiation” to the Caltech biology faculty.
October 4
New Soviet H-bomb test series begun
October
At the last minute, the AEC prevented Muller from being an American delegate to the
UN Atoms for Peace Conference and prevent him from presenting his warning about
fallout radiation and genes
October 28
George Beadle’s Science Editorial “Liquidating Unpopular Opinion” responds to the
AEC’s exclusion of Muller’s paper from the UN Peaceful Uses of the Atom conference
November 28
Lewis replied to Beadle and the biology faculty with his “Memorandum on Fallout.”
November 30
The New York Times reported on the findings of the Atom Bomb Casualty Commission.
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December
Gordon Dunning of the AEC published the “Effects of Nuclear Weapons Testing” in the
Scientific Monthly.  He claimed that “the highest measured radiation exposure to the
thyroid of human beings has been far below that needed to produce any detectable
effects.”
December 3




AEC Commissioner Murray makes public call for moratorium, endorsed by Democratic
Presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson.
May 21-July 21
Operation REDWING tests in the Marshall Islands
June 12
The National Academy of Sciences released its report on “The Biological Effects of
Atomic Radiation” (BEIR).
October 14
Ten Caltech physicists who had participated in the building of the original atomic bombs
published and advertisement in the Los Angles Times in support of Democratic
Presidential candidate Adalai Stevenson and cessation of nuclear weapons testing.  The
biological effects of radioactive fallout were among their reasons for opposing testing.
October 15
Caltech President DuBridge and Chairman of the Board of Trustees Ruddock both
publicly responded to the physicists’ advertisement.
October 25
Pauling wrote Beadle and carbon copied Lewis and Sturtevant about a case of leukemia
that a reported from Tonopah, Nevada called him about.
October 26
Sturtevant published a Letter to the Editor in The Washington Post countering an October
15th article headed “Tenfold Rise in A-Tests Seen as Safe.”  He explained that he had sat
on the National Academy of Sciences BEIR Committee and that the Committee was
falsely credited with this conclusion.  Furthermore, Libby, who chaired the AEC Division
of Biology and Medicine, had recently indicated that the Sr-90 danger was greater than
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previously reported to that committee.  Consequently, their conclusions about the danger
from fallout would need “revision upward.”
November 30
Lewis circulated a draft of his “Leukemia and Ionizing Radiation” paper to Caltech
faculty members including Linus Pauling and Harrison Brown.  Brown sent it (or a
summary) to Schweitzer, probably via Norman Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review
and founder of SANE.
1957
January 19-April 26
Soviet nuclear tests in Siberia
February 18
Beadle addressed the American Pharmaceutical Manufactures Association, Mid-Winter
Conference on the topic of “Chemical Genetics and Radiation Effects.”  He compared the
hazard posed by fallout to that of medical x-rays and stressed the need to minimize x-
radiation exposure.
April 24
Albert Schweitzer released his open letter on nuclear bomb testing through the Nobel
Committee.
April 25
W. F. Libby published an open letter to Schweitzer arguing that his own standard of
concern was “detectable effects” and that the risks caused by radioactive fallout were
small.
May 2
W. F. Libby of the AEC wrote Pauling a critical letter regarding his estimation that 1,000
people would die of leukemia as a result from an upcoming British Hydrogen bomb tests.
May 10
Pauling replied to Libby’s letter, explaining that he had made his estimation using
Lewis’s as yet unpublished estimate among a small group after a lecture on abnormal
hemoglobin.
May 15
Britain’s first H-bomb test at Christmas Island
Scientists’ Bomb-test Appeal initiated by Pauling
May 17
Lewis published “Leukemia and Ionizing Radiation” in Science.
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May 25
President Eisenhower approved a temporary test ban
Brown published an article in the Saturday Review in its “Forum on the Schweitzer
Declaration:  What is a “Small” Risk?”  He explained that the risk of increased incidence
of leukemia from low doses of radiation “was uncovered by a lone geneticist, Professor
E. B. Lewis.”
May 27 - June 7
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy held hearings on the “Nature of Radioactive
Fallout and Its Effects on Man.”
June 3
Pauling presented the Scientist’s Test Ban Petition to Eisenhower.
June 10
Lewis appeared in the Life Magazine article “Nuclear Worries:  The nation begins to
worry in earnest about its nuclear tests as scientists explain their fallout warnings to a
congressional committee”
June 21
Lewis gave a summary of his paper at the organizing meeting in New York for what
became The Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy.
July 16
Beadle wrote Dr. Sterling Emerson of the AEC’s Division of Biology and Medicine
regarding several articles by Elizabeth Coulson printed in the El Monte Herald which
misrepresented the estimates of fallout risks generated by Caltech faculty.
September 19
First underground nuclear weapons test in Nevada.
October 3
Beadle moderated a panel discussion on the “Health Hazards of Radiation” at the
California Division of the American Cancer Society’s Annual Meeting.
October 4
The launch of Sputnik launch intensified Cold War fears of the Soviet Union.
October 20
The New York Times reported that the AEC’s Advisory Committee on Biology and
Medicine had considered the dangers of radioactive fallout from nuclear testing and
concluded that they were “well within tolerable limits” and would continue to be so if the
global rate of testing did not increase from that of the preceding five years.
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In a separate article on leukemia they reported that the testing was estimated to produce
196 cases of leukemia in the United States beyond the 11,400 per year that were “not
attributable to test radiation.”
1958
Pauling publishes his book No More War!
January 13
Pauling presented the Scientists’ Test Ban Petition to the UN
March 13
The first meeting of the Surgeon General’s National Advisory Committee on Radiation;
Lewis was a founding member.
April 28-August 12
HARDTACK I H-bomb test series in the Pacific.
June 30
Admiral Lewis Strauss resigns as AEC Chairman; former member of the Caltech Board
of Trustees, John McCone is appointed by Eisenhower.
August
A. W. Kimball publishes “Evaluation of Data Relating Human Leukemia and Ionizing
Radiation” in the Journal of the National Cancer Institute criticizing Lewis’s statistical
analysis.
August
The Soviet government announced that they would stop all tests.  On August 22nd
President Eisenhower announced a moratorium on US nuclear-weapons tests.
September 12-October 30
HARDTACK II atomic tests in Nevada
1959
March 15
A letter written by General Loper and released by Senator Anderson states that Sr-90




The Surgeon General’s National Advisory Committee on Radiation recommended that
primary authority for radiation safety be vested in the U.S. Public Health Service, rather
than the AEC.
June
Lewis published “Thyroid Radiation Doses from Fallout” in the Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences.
May 5-8
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy held hearings on “Fallout from Nuclear
Weapons Tests.”
May 7
Lewis reported on radioiodine and leukemia at the congressional hearings.
June 22-26
Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Congressional
Committee on Atomic Energy on the “Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear
War”
August 14
Eisenhower created the Federal Radiation Council “to provide advice on radiation safety
and to reassure the public about the federal government’s objectivity in evaluating fallout
hazards.”
1959-61
Voluntary atmospheric-testing cessation by the United States and the Soviet Union which
ended with a Soviet test on September 1, 1961
1961
September 15
The United States resumed underground nuclear testing.
September 20
President Kennedy approved Federal Radiation Council’s proposal to change guidelines
for population exposure to strontium 89, strontium 90, iodine 131, and radium 226.  AEC




The United States resumed atmospheric testing in the Pacific.
June 1
The Federal Radiation Council released its report on the “Health Implications of Fallout
from Nuclear Weapons Testing through 1961.”
1963
December
Lewis published “Leukemia, Multiple Myeloma, and Aplastic Anemia in American
Radiologists” in Science.
August 5
The Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed by the US, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.
This treaty banned nuclear tests in the oceans, in the atmosphere, and in outer space.
October 10
The Test Ban Treaty went into effect.
And the Nobel Committee announced that it would award the 1962 Peace Prize to Linus
Pauling.
1970




Lewis published a letter on “Leukemia, Radiation, and Hyperthyrodism” in Science.
86
1976
Lewis prepared an “Analysis of lung tumor mortality in the Batelle Beagle Lifespan
experiment” which became part of the Ad Hoc Committee on “Hot Particles” of the
Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations of the NAS and
National Research Council’s report on the Health Effects of Alpha-Emitting Particles in
the Respiratory Tract.  This report was published by the Environmental Protection
Agency.
1992
President George Bush Sr. ended all nuclear weapons testing in the United States and
instructed US laboratories to use computer models and other methods to asses the
national nuclear stockpile without test detonations.
1995
Sir Richard Doll of England published “Hazards of ionizing radiation:  100 years of
observations on man” in the British Journal of Cancer.  In this review article he
supported the linearity hypothesis as articulated by Lewis in 1957, ending, in the minds
of some, the threshold debate.
1998
September 17-20
Lewis presented a paper titled “Ionizing Radiation, Cancer Induction and Radioactive
Fallout” at the Curie Symposium:  The Discovery of Polonium and Radium—its scientific
and philosophical consequences, benefits and threats to mankind.
2002
The Bush administration began taking steps to enable the resumption of underground
nuclear weapons testing.
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